VERDICTS OF CONSCIENCE: NULLIFICATION AND NECESSITY AS JURY RESPONSES TO CRIMES OF CONSCIENCE by Schopp, Robert F
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
College of Law, Faculty Publications Law, College of 
1996 
VERDICTS OF CONSCIENCE: NULLIFICATION AND NECESSITY AS 
JURY RESPONSES TO CRIMES OF CONSCIENCE 
Robert F. Schopp 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, rschopp1@unl.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/lawfacpub 
 Part of the Legal Studies Commons 
Schopp, Robert F., "VERDICTS OF CONSCIENCE: NULLIFICATION AND NECESSITY AS JURY RESPONSES 
TO CRIMES OF CONSCIENCE" (1996). College of Law, Faculty Publications. 104. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/lawfacpub/104 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of 
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in College of Law, Faculty Publications by an authorized 
administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
VERDICTS OF CONSCIENCE:
NULLIFICATION AND NECESSITY
AS JURY RESPONSES TO
CRIMES OF CONSCIENCE
ROBERT F. SCHoPP*
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................... 2040
II. CRIMES OF CONSCIENCE ........................... 2042
III. JURY NULLIFICATION .............................. 2044
A. TIE CENTRAL EXPLICIT DEBATE ................... 2044
B. THE ISSUES ................................. ........ 2046
1. The Historical Issue ............................. 2046
2. The Consequentialist Issue: Equal Justice or
Anarchy? ....................................... 2046
3. The Deontic Issues: Democratic Self-Government
and Integrity .................................... 2049
C. TiHm ARGUMENTS ................................... 2049
1. The Consequentialist Arguments: Clarifying the
Concepts and Considering the Evidence ......... 2049
2. The Deontic Argument from Democratic Self-
Government ..................................... 2055
3. The Deontic Argument from Deception and the
Moral Force of the Criminal Law ............... 2059
D. NULLIFICATION AS A POWER AND AS A RIGHT ..... 2062
IV. THE NORMATIVE STRUCTURE .................... 2065
A. POLITICAL LIBERALISM ............................. 2066
B. Ti-E CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THE LIBERAL
SOCIETY ............................................ 2074
C. JUSTIFICATION DEFENSES ........................... 2076
* Professor of Law and Psychology, University of Nebraska; Visiting Professor of Law,
University of San Diego.
Prior versions of this paper have been presented at faculty colloquia at the Universities of
Nebraska, New Mexico, and Utah. I am grateful to members of all three faculties, and particu-
larly to Robert Audi, Barb Sturgis, Steve Willborn, and Bob Works.
2039
Schopp in Southern California Law Review (1996) 69. Copyright 1996, Southern California Law Review. Used by permission.
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:2039
V. NULLIFICATION AND NECESSITY IN A
LIBERAL SOCIETY .................................. 2079
A. DECEPTION AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM .................................... 2079
B. NULLIFICATION AND NECESSITY .................... 2080
C. NECESSITY .......................................... 2082
D. NULLIFICATION BEYOND NECESSITY ................ 2091
1. Intrasystemic Nullification Appealing to Mercy.. 2094
2. Extrasystemic Nullification ...................... 2098
E. SUMMARY ........................................... 2101
VI. THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF PERSONS IN A
LIBERAL SOCIETY .................................. 2102
A. THE ZENGER TRIAL AND NULLIFICATION .......... 2102
1. The Objection from the Zenger Trial ........... 2102
2. Juror Nullification and Nullification
Instructions ..................................... 2103
3. Judicial Nullification ............................ 2110
B. CONFLICTING OBLIGATIONS: TENSION RATHER
THAN CONTRADICTION .............................. 2115
VII. CONCLUSION ......................................... 2115
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider three types of atypical criminal defendants. The first
trespasses at a nuclear weapons plant (or a segregated bus station or
women's health clinic) in order to publicly protest a law or public pol-
icy represented by that facility or by the activity that occurs there.
The second operates an underground railroad in violation of the Fugi-
tive Slave Act (or smuggles South American residents into the United
States or breaks into a women's health clinic in order to disable equip-
ment and prevent scheduled abortions). The third causes the death of
a loved one by disconnecting that person from life sustaining medical
machinery in order to fulfill a promise to that person or to spare that
person the pain or indignity of such an existence.
All three types of defendants violate legally valid laws out of a
sense of conscience. All understand the nature and consequences of
their acts, and none suffer any disability that might ground a legal
excuse. No ordinary defense clearly applies, yet punishment may
raise intuitive discomfort. Many readers might ask, "Are these the




Such defendants sometimes seek judicial instructions regarding
either jury nullification or the necessity defense.' Although appellate
courts almost universally reject these requests, trial courts occasion-
ally instruct regarding the necessity defense, and these instructions
sometimes generate acquittals.2 Because commentators debate the
propriety of jury nullification and the necessity defense separately,
they do not clarify the relationship between the two or between each
and crimes of conscience.3 Those who favor nullification tend to cite
apparent examples in which juries nullify in service of noble causes,
including free speech and resistance to slavery.4 Those who oppose
nullification tend to cite apparent examples of jury nullification moti-
vated by racial bias or animosity.'
This Article examines the appropriate roles for jury nullification
and the necessity defense as jury responses to crimes of conscience. It
clarifies the role and parameters of each and examines the relation-
ship between the two. Finally, the analysis considers the significance
of these doctrines in understanding the juror's responsibilities both as
a subject of and a temporary official in the criminal justice system and
as an individual moral agent. As such, this Article presents a prelimi-
nary inquiry into the manner in which a person should understand the
normative force of legal obligation in relation to individual
conscience.
The analysis presented in this paper differs from that found in
some of the literature in a manner that warrants a word of caution.
Prior debate has focused to a substantial degree upon historical issues
1. Matthew Lippman, The Necessity Defense and Political Protest, 26 CRIM. L. BuuL. 317
(1990); Alan W. Scheffin & Jon M. Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy,
43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1980, at 51.
2. Arlene D. Boxerman, Comment, The Use of the Necessity Defense by Abortion Clinic
Protesters, 81 J. CIm. L. & CRnNoLoGY 677, 690 n.90 (1990) (trial courts allowing the neces-
sity defense); Lippman, supra note 1, at 317 (appellate courts rejecting the necessity defense);
Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 1, at 63-68 (appellate courts rejecting nullification); Laura J.
Schulkind, Note, Applying the Necessity Defense to Civil Disobedience Cases, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv.
79, 81 n.13 (1989) (trial courts allowing the necessity defense).
3. Regarding the necessity defense, see Steven M. Bauer & Peter J. Eckerstrom, Note,
The State Made Me Do It: The Applicability of the Necessity Defense to Civil Disobedience, 39
STAN. L. REV. 1173,1186-87 (1987) (discussing the necessity defense as providing an opportunity
to nullify); Lippman, supra note 1; Boxerman, supra note 2; Schulkind, supra note 2. Regarding
nullification, see Scheffin & Van Dyke, supra note 1; Alan W. Scheflin & Jon M. Van Dyke,
Merciful Juries: The Resilience of Jury Nullification, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 165 (1991); Gary J.
Simson, Jury Nullification in the American System: A Skeptical View, 54 Tx. L. REv. 488 (1976).
4. Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 1, at 89.
5. Candace McCoy, If Hard Cases Make Bad Law, Easy Juries Make Bad Facts: A Re-
sponse to Professor Levine, 18 LEMGAL STUD. F. 497, 501 (1994).
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regarding the place of nullification or the necessity defense in English
or colonial common law. Moreover, such debate has attempted to un-
derstand the jury's role at the time the Constitution was ratified.6 The
inquiry here directly addresses analytic and normative, rather than
historical, questions. Analytically, what constitutes jury nullification,
and what is its relationship to selected other aspects of the criminal
justice system, especially the necessity defense? Normatively, do the
principles of political morality underlying the criminal justice system
justify nullification as a legitimate component of that system, and what
parameters of nullification would that justification support? What, if
anything, justifies separate roles for nullification and the necessity de-
fense in the same system?
Section II briefly explicates the notion of crimes of conscience
discussed in this Article. I do not provide a complete analysis or de-
fense of crimes of conscience because the Article directly addresses
jury responses to this conduct, rather than the crimes themselves. Sec-
tion III explores the ongoing debate regarding jury nullification in or-
der to clarify the central issues and evaluate the recent arguments.
This Section establishes the context and conditions of adequacy for
the position advanced in sections IV through VI. Section IV discusses
the criminal justice process in a liberal society as the normative struc-
ture that provides the foundation for the positive analysis of nullifica-
tion, necessity, and the responsibilities of persons as presented in
Sections V and VI. Section VII concludes the Article.
II. CRIMES OF CONSCIENCE
According to one widely endorsed conception, civil disobedience
involves a violation of the law performed in public, motivated by con-
science, and intended as an act of communication that appeals to the
conscience of the majority.7 Those who engage in this conduct do so
as a dramatic appeal to the conscience of the community in order to
encourage the majority to demand change in the law or policy at issue.
Some writers would limit the category of civil disobedience to nonvio-
lent offenses and require that the offenders accept the prescribed legal
6. Phillip B. Scott, Jury Nullification: An Historical Perspective on a Modern Debate, 91 W.
VA. L. REv. 389 (1989); Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 1, at 56-63; Simson, supra note 3, at
491-507.
7. JoHN RAwis, A TmEORY oF JuSTICE § 55 (1971).
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punishment, while others would contest these limitations.8 Clear
cases of civil disobedience include crimes of trespass at various facili-
ties including segregated bus stations, nuclear facilities, or women's
health clinics, provided that these acts are intended as public acts of
communication designed to elicit the majority's support in challenging
the law or policy protested.
Conscientious resistance involves conduct contrary to law and
motivated by conscience, but it differs from civil disobedience in that
it does not take the form of an act of communication that appeals to
the majority's sense of justice. Individuals might perform crimes of
conscientious resistance in order to challenge law or policy, to prevent
its evil effects, or, at least, to refuse to ratify or acquiesce in that law or
policy.9 Crimes of conscience that constitute conscientious resistance
rather than civil disobedience include, for example, secretly smugglinginmigrants across the border for the purpose of securing their safety
rather than as an attempt to publicly challenge immigration policy.
Similarly, occupying women's health centers for the purpose of physi-
cally preventing today's scheduled abortions from occurring rather
than as an appeal for legal change falls within this category.10 A par-
ticular act or series of acts might qualify as both civil disobedience and
conscientious resistance if that behavior is intended both to appeal to
public opinion in order to elicit public pressure for change in the law
or policy challenged and to ameliorate the effects of that law or policy.
Crimes of personal moral obligation involve conscientious viola-
tions of law. However, such crimes do not constitute civil disobedi-
ence or conscientious resistance because they do not take the form of
acts of communication, and they are not intended to change, resist, or
perfect law. The individuals who commit these crimes pursue per-
sonal rather than institutional goals. Individuals perform crimes of
8. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN Focus (Hugo A. Bedau ed., 1991); CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (Paul
Harris ed., 1989) (two recent collections of articles discussing various issues regarding civil diso-
bedience); RAvLs, supra note 7, § 55 (requiring nonviolence). I will not attempt to address these
disputes here because this paper is primarily concerned with juror responses to crimes of con-
science rather than with advancing a precise theory of the crimes themselves. For the same
reason, I will not attend to the distinction sometimes made between direct and indirect civil
disobedience.
9. RAWLS, supra note 7, § 56 (discussing a closely related notion of conscientious refusal);
Henry D. Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, in CIL DISOBEDIENCE IN Focus, supra note 8, at 28
(emphasizing refusal to participate in or acquiesce in an evil government or policy). Thoreau
also engaged in conscientious resistance through participation in the underground railroad.
HENRY S. SALT, Lnu OF HENRY DAVID THOREAU 72-73 (1993).
10. United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989) (smuggling illegal immigrants);
Commonwealth v. Wall, 539 A.2d 1325 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (occupying women's health clinic).
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personal moral obligation when they commit criminal offenses in or-
der to fulfill some extralegal source of obligation that they understand
as overriding any obligation they have to obey the law in question. A
husband might conclude, for example, that an obligation of loyalty to
his wife requires that he fulfill her request that he disconnect the med-
ical life-support equipment from which she is unable to free herself.
He might also conclude that this relationship-based obligation is so
strong that it outweighs any obligation he might have to conform to
law in general or to the homicide statute specifically.
Crimes of civil disobedience, conscientious resistance, and per-
sonal moral obligation share the following characteristics. Those who
commit all three types of crimes conscientiously believe that impor-
tant moral considerations justify their conduct. All such crimes fulfill
the offense elements of some offense definition, and no specific de-
fense clearly applies." Either the act, the person, or both may seem
intuitively not to be "criminal" in the usual sense. Criminal punish-
ment of these people for these acts may elicit discomfort; "Are these
the types of people and conduct we had in mind when we built the
prisons?"
III. JURY NULLIFICATION
A. THE CENTRAL EXPLICIT DEBATE
Courts and commentators generally do not dispute the jury's
power to acquit despite legal guilt. The power arises from the criminal
justice system's reliance on general verdicts, the refusal to allow in-
quiry into the grounds for the jury verdict, and the double jeopardy
prohibition on retrying an acquitted defendant.12 The jury does not
possess the same unconstrained power to convict despite legal inno-
cence because the judge can set aside a jury verdict of guilty, and the
defendant can appeal a conviction.'3 Commentators sometimes differ
in the manner in which they characterize nullification. Some, for ex-
ample, describe juries as having the ultimate power to decide facts and
11. The necessity defense remains an arguable possibility, but it is not ordinarily accepted.
See infra part V.C.
12. JOSHUA DRFtssrIER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 1.02[c][1], at 5 (2d ed. 1995);
Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 1, at 111; Scott, supra note 6, at 391; Simson, supra note 3, at
524.
13. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29 (udgment of acquittal); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 27.1 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing appeals); Schefin & Van Dyke, supra




law in criminal cases. 4 Others describe nullification as a process
through which jurors take a judicial or legislative role.'5 The com-
mentators agree, however, that nullification does not involve the
power to invalidate a statute, overturn it as unconstitutional, or create
new law or precedential force. Thus, any particular jury's power to
"decide law" extends only to the case before it. 6
The central explicit debate involves the manner in which judges
should instruct juries regarding their power to nullify. Opponents of
explicit nullification instructions defend the status quo, according to
which the judge instructs the jurors regarding applicable law and di-
rects them to resolve the case by deciding the factual issues and apply-
ing the law as instructed by the judge to those facts. Standard
instructions do not inform jurors of their power to depart from the law
as instructed. Rather, these instructions frame the jurors' responsibil-
ity in a manner that explicitly or implicitly communicates to jurors
that they must apply the law as instructed.' 7
Advocates of nullification instructions criticize these standard in-
structions as deceptive. They contend that the judge should instruct
the jurors regarding the relevant law and should direct them to grant
substantial weight to that law. The judge should also inform them,
however, that they may acquit despite legal guilt if mercy or justice
requires acquittal as a matter of conscience.'
14. Scheffin & Van Dyke, supra note 1, at 79-85 (discussing the constitutional provisions of
Indiana and Maryland).
15. Simson, supra note 3, at 506-07.
16. Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 1, at 55-56, 72, 80-81, 87; Scott, supra note 6, at 392.
17. CALuc 0.50 (Jan. 1996 Supp.) ("You must accept and follow the law as I state it.
4 OJI § 4.03.03 (1995) ("It is your sworn duty ... to apply the law as it is given to you.");
JosEPINE R. PoTuTo, STEPHEN A. SALTZHURG & HARvEY S. PERLMAN, FEDERAL CRIMINAL
JURY INSTRUCIIONS § 3.55 (2d ed. & Supp. 1993) ("I will give you the law .... You must decide
whether (the) (a) defendant is guilty or not guilty by applying the evidence to the law."); Schef-
lin & Van Dyke, supra note 1, at 102-07; Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 3 (criticizing current
instructions as deceptive).
18. Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 1, at 54-55 (Jurors should be instructed that
"although they are a public body bound to give respectful attention to the laws, they
have the final authority to decide whether or not to apply a given law to the acts of the
defendant .... [] that they represent their communities and that it is appropriate to
bring into their deliberations the feelings of the community and their own feelings
based on conscience .... [, and that] despite their respect for the law, nothing would
bar them from acquitting the defendant if they feel that the law, as applied to the fact
situation before them, would produce an inequitable or unjust result.") (quoting Jon
Van Dyke, The Jury as a Political Institution, 16 CAT. LAW. 224, 241 (1970)).
See generally, Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 3.
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B. THE IssuEs
1. The Historical Issue
The disputants debate the historical role of nullification and the
significance of that historical role for a constitutional right to a trial by
jury. Advocates of nullification instructions contend that current in-
structions undermine the historical role of the jury and thus violate
the defendant's right to a jury trial which historically includes the
jury's power to decide the facts and the law.19 Opponents contend
that the jury's historical power to decide the law and facts addressed
the responsibility to apply the law to the facts rather than authority to
make independent determinations of law. 0 They argue that impor-
tant considerations supporting authority to nullify during the colonial
period do not currently apply because contemporary judges, in con-
trast to colonial judges, are substantially more knowledgeable about
the law than are the jurors, and because contemporary American law
is democratically established rather than imposed by a foreign
power.21 This paper does not pursue the historical disputes because it
addresses the analytic and normative issues.
2. The Consequentialist Issue: Equal Justice or Anarchy?22
The disputants disagree about the relative effectiveness of nullifi-
cation instructions and of current instructions in attaining just out-
comes. Advocates of nullification instructions contend that such
instructions would promote equal justice rather than anarchy because
appropriate instructions would enable juries to understand the power
and its appropriate role, leading them to exercise it seriously, care-
fully, and consistently when justice demands departure from the writ-
ten law. They contend that the current approach distorts the jury
function and undermines equality of justice because some defendants
will have access to jurors who are aware of their power to nullify while
19. Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 1, at 56-79; Chaya Weinberg-Brodt, Note, Jury Nullifi-
cation and Jury-Control Procedures, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 825 (1990).
20. Scott, supra note 6, at 406, 414-16; Simson, supra note 3, at 491-96.
21. Scott, supra note 6, at 416-19; Simson, supra note 3, at 496-505.
22. As I use the terms in this paper, purely consequentialist theories identify the right
action as that which will produce good outcomes, where good outcomes are those which
maximize production of the value endorsed by the theory as the fundamental good. Deontic
theories deny this direct relationship between the good and the right, contending that the right
action is determined at least partially by generally formulated duties and principles that carry
positive moral weight independent of the consequences. WiLuAM K. FRANKENA, ETIcs 14-16
(2d ed. 1973) (Frankena uses the term "teleological" rather than "consequentialist.").
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others will not. This difference among juries is arbitrary in that it de-
pends on jurors' fortuitous awareness of their power to depart from
the judge's instructions and on their willingness to reject the judge's
apparent authority rather than on any morally relevant factor, such as
justice or desert.23
Opponents of nullification instructions contend that current prac-
tices promote the rule of law and equality under law. By constraining
the jury to the legal rules rather than judgments of conscience, the
status quo assures that each defendant's conduct will be evaluated
under legal rules that were in force at the time the conduct occurred,
and barring legislative change in the law, that the same legal standard
will apply to all persons accused of engaging in similar conduct. Nulli-
fication instructions might encourage jurors to depart from the law
frequently, casually, or on the basis of bias, resulting in disparate ver-
dicts for defendants who engaged in similar conduct in similar
circumstances.24
Those who support the current approach contend that it discour-
ages nullification but does not prevent jurors from nullifying when ex-
treme circumstances demand rectification. By refusing to instruct
jurors regarding their power of nullification but providing no mecha-
nism to reverse or sanction juries that nullify, the criminal justice sys-
tem maintains a generally consistent rule-based system, yet it allows
nullification in circumstances so clear that jurors converge on the need
to do so on their own. Thus, the status quo allows nullification but
limits it to cases in which the prospect of clear and serious injustice
motivates jurors to override judicial instructions. 25 Finally, the cur-
rent mandatory instructions support jurors who encounter cases in
which justice demands an unpopular decision. Jurors can resist popu-
lar opinion more effectively when their institutional role requires that
they apply the law as instructed.26
As with many consequentialist disputes, the central controversies
between the participants in this debate are primarily empirical rather
than normative. The writers do not advance competing conceptions of
23. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1972); George C. Christie,
Lawful Departures from Legal Rules: "Jury Nullification" and Legitimated Disobedience, 62 CAL-
L. Rnv. 1289, 1303 (1974) (discussing arbitrary variations in jury awareness and tough-minded-
ness); Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 1, at 101-08.
24. MoRTaIER R. KADisH & SANoij H. KADISH, DisCREnON TO DISOBEY 64-65 (1973);
Simson, supra note 3, at 512-15, 518-19.
25. KADISH & KADISH, supra note 24, at 65; Simson, supra note 3, at 523-25.
26. Christie, supra note 23, at 1304; Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 1, at 108-11.
1996] 2047
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:2039
just outcomes, nor do they disagree about the relative merits of anar-
chy and equal justice. Rather, they disagree about jurors' current
knowledge regarding the power of nullification absent instructions
and about the likely effect of explicit instructions on eliciting just out-
comes or anarchy.
The argument in favor of the status quo rests partially on the
claim that the lack of explicit nullification instructions limits nullifica-
tion to cases in which justice clearly demands it. It seems intuitively
probable that the current instructions would render many jurors less
willing to depart from the legal rules than would instructions explicitly
authorizing nullification.2 7 Thus, many jurors would need a strong
motive to nullify with the current instructions. Those who defend cur-
rent instructions provide no reason to believe, however, that the de-
sire to do justice provides a motive that is uniquely likely to supply
this impetus. The argument needs some empirical support for the
claim that the desire to do justice is more likely than bias or personal
animosity, for example, to provide sufficient motivation to promote
such departures.
Similarly, those who advocate nullification instructions provide
no evidence to support the claim that explicit instructions would gen-
erate consistent, disciplined application of nullification when war-
ranted by the demands of justice. The point here is that these disputes
rest on empirical premises that cannot be resolved solely by appeal to
normative argument or legal theory. Advocates and opponents of in-
structions agree on the value of equal justice in outcome and on the
importance of maintaining the rule of law and avoiding anarchy. They
disagree about the probable effects of explicit nullification instructions
as a method for promoting the mutually endorsed values and out-
comes. Thus, at this level of debate, the dispute regarding these con-
sequentialist arguments involves competing empirical hypotheses
rather than normative disagreement. Satisfactory resolution of this
dispute requires empirical support for these premises regarding the
likely effects of various patterns of jury instructions. In the absence of
clear data, legislatures and judges must act on the best available esti-
mates, but in doing so, they should examine the available evidence
and recognize their decisions as subject to revision if future informa-
tion calls those estimates into question.
27. Empirical data supports this notion. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
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3. The Deontic Issues: Democratic Self-Government and Integrio28
Advocates of nullification instructions also advance at least two
separate deontic arguments that do not depend primarily on empirical
claims. First, they claim that the principle of democratic self-govern-
ment requires nullification instructions. The current approach pre-
vents the jury, as the representatives of the people in the criminal
process, from making a final decision regarding the laws under which
the people shall be judged.2 9 Second, they argue that the current ap-
proach undermines the moral force of the criminal law because it de-
ceives jurors regarding their power of nullification20 The latter claim
could take a consequentialist, and hence an empirical form. One
could argue that defendants, jurors, and members of the public who
become aware of this policy of judicial deception are likely to lose
faith in the system as a source of justice. They will become less in-
clined, therefore, to attribute any moral force to the rules of the crimi-
nal law as guidelines for voluntary compliance in their lives. The force
of this version of the argument would depend heavily on empirical
hypotheses about the probability that many people would become
aware of this deception and about the likely effects of this awareness.
The deontic form of the argument does not, however, require this em-
pirical element. On the deontic interpretation, the claim is that re-
gardless of the possible effects, the deceptive instructions undermine
the moral authority of the system by violating important moral princi-
ples requiring honesty and respect for the participants in the process.'
C. THE ARGUMENTS
1. The Consequentialist Arguments: Clarifying the Concepts and
Considering the Evidence
Available evidence indicates that nullification occurs, but infre-
quently. Historical events provide a few well known accounts of ex-
plicit nullification.32 The current practice of refusing instructions or
argument regarding nullification and refraining from inquiry into the
basis of jury decisions renders it very difficult to clearly identify recent
cases of nullification. Commentators sometimes infer nullification
28. See supra note 22 (explaining the relationship between deontic and consequentialist
arguments).
29. Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 1, at 93-94, 111.
30. Id. at 105-06; Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 3, at 179-83.
31. See infra part III.C.3 for a more detailed discussion on this point.
32. See generally Scott, supra note 6.
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from popular accounts of recent trials, but these inferences are diffi-
cult to confirm in that they may reflect different interpretations of the
relevant law or facts.3 Recent systematic studies of trial results infer
nullification from verdicts that diverge from judges' or researchers'
evaluation of the evidence. These studies generally support the im-
pression that most juries diligently attempt to decide cases on the ba-
sis of the evidence presented and the law as instructed by the judge.
A small percentage of verdicts seem to represent jury departure from
the evidence and the law in a manner suggesting that the jurors nulli-
fied the law as instructed by the judge. However, the ambiguities of
interpretation that complicate the commentators' inferences also ap-
ply to these systematic observations. 34
These inferences that nullification occurred remain tentative be-
cause it is very difficult to distinguish deliberate nullification from de-
partures due to misunderstanding of instructions or evaluations of the
evidence that differ from those of the judges or researchers.3 5 Some
researchers contend that most nullification may take the form of indi-
rect or subconscious nullification which occurs when misgivings about
the law or about the justice of anticipated outcomes affect the inter-
pretation and evaluation of ambiguous evidence regarding factual is-
sues.36 Jury verdicts that deviate from strict compliance with the law
due to a misunderstanding of judicial instructions or to a misinterpre-
tation of evidence raise important empirical and normative issues, but
the appropriate analysis might differ from that which applies to nullifi-
cation as a deliberate verdict of conscience. For the sake of clarity, I
will use "jury deviation" to refer to the broad category of cases in
which jury verdicts deviate from verdicts most consistent with the ju-
dicial instructions as applied to the evidence. I reserve "jury nullifica-
tion" for that subset of jury deviation in which jurors deliberately
deviate as a matter of conscience.
33. See, e.g., James P. Levine, The Role of Jury Nullification Instructions in the Quest for
Justice, 18 LEoAL SUn. F. 473, 480-81 (1994) (citing the recent acquittals of Jack Kevorkian,
Marion Barry, Amy Carter, and Abbie Hoffman); McCoy, supra note 5, at 501 (discussing, inter
alia, the refusal of Southern whites to convict other whites charged with crimes against blacks);
Paul H. Robinson, Are Criminal Codes Irrelevant?, 68 S. CAt. L. Rv. 159, 172-76 (1994) (dis-
cussing difficulty in differentiating nullification from misunderstanding).
34. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, Tim AMERICAN JURY 494-95 (1971); James P.
Levine, The Legislative Role of Juries, 1984 AM. B. FouND. Rns. J. 605, 633; Martha A. Myers,
Rule Departures and Making Law: Juries and Their Verdicts, 13 L. & Soc'y REv. 781 (1979).
35. Robinson, supra note 33, at 172-76.
36. VALERm P. HANs & NFr VmMAR, JUDGING TIM JURY 154 (1988); KALVEN & ZEISEL,
supra note 34, at 495; Levine, supra note 34, at 633.
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Recent studies of mock juries support the hypotheses that explicit
nullification instructions would affect both jury verdicts and the delib-
erative process. These studies employed mock juries who listened to
audiotapes of trials addressing three different types of crimes and then
received jury instructions that either explicitly informed them of their
power to nullify or conformed to the common current practice of in-
structing them to decide the facts and apply the law as instructed by
the judge. The juries each deliberated collectively and arrived at a
common verdict. The results demonstrated that different instructions
affected both verdicts and the process of deliberation, although these
effects varied with the type of case.37
Although the nullification instructions specifically addressed the
jury's power to acquit, the juries who received these instructions
demonstrated tendencies toward increased acquittals in certain cases
and toward increased convictions in other cases. 38 Nullification in-
structions apparently promoted verdicts deviating from the strict ap-
plication of the law to the evidence in both directions. This evidence
casts doubt upon the premise that framing explicit instructions in
terms of acquittal allows exculpatory deviations from the law when
justice requires acquittals without increasing the probability that ju-
rors will deviate from the law in order to convict defendants who are
not legally guilty. The evidence gathered regarding deliberations indi-
cated that juries receiving nullification instructions were less narrowly
focused on the evidence. Rather, the juries directed more attention
toward issues such as the defendant's character and their own related
experience. The precise content of this nonevidentiary material va-
ried with the type of case presented as did the tendency toward acquit-
tals or convictions.3 9 This effect of nullification instructions on the
deliberative process renders it very difficult to clearly identify these
results as revealing deliberate jury nullification rather than jury
deviation.
This set of data suggests that nullification instructions may en-
courage juries to feel less constrained by the evidence and more open
37. Irwin A. Horowitz, The Effect of Jury Nullification Instruction on Verdicts and Jury
Functioning in Criminal Trials, 9 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 25 (1985) [hereinafter Horowitz 1985];
Irwin A. Horowitz, The Impact of Judicial Instructions, Arguments, and Challenges on Jury Deci-
sion Making, 12 L. & HuM. Bm-Hv. 439 (1988) [hereinafter Horowitz 1988]; Jeffrey Kerwin &
David R. Shaffer, The Effects of Jury Dogmatism on Reactions to Jury Nullification Instructions,
17 PERSONALrrY & Soc. PsYcHoL- Buts. 140 (1991).
38. Horowitz 1985, supra note 37, at 32-36; Horowitz 1988, supra note 37, at 446-52.
39. See sources cited supra note 37.
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to influence by a variety of nonevidentiary matters. This possibility
raises the concern that nullification instructions may increase the dan-
ger of "malignant" jury deviation. Instructions that render jury delib-
eration and decision relatively susceptible to nonevidentiary
influences may decrease the probability of just outcomes by increasing
the potential effect of contaminating influences such as bias or ani-
mosity. Such malignant deviation might occur as a conscious decision
to depart from the law out of malice, bias, or personal preference.
Alternately, it might take the form sometimes referred to as indirect
or subconscious nullification in which bias or expectation distorts the
interpretation of evidence. Such a deviation may take either exculpa-
tory or inculpatory forms, whereby a juror may exercise bias that fa-
vors or disfavors a defendant.
Some commentators interpret nullification as a means of cor-
recting or perfecting the criminal process as an institution for dispens-
ing justice.n It might serve this corrective function when juries resort
to nullification in order to acquit defendants who do not deserve pun-
ishment but are technically guilty due to the necessary imprecision of
legal rules.4 ' The data reported in these studies suggests, however,
that nullification instructions may produce a less predictable tendency
to depart from the discipline of rule and evidence, resulting in depar-
tures from strictly legal verdicts toward either increased acquittal or
conviction for a variety of reasons. Thus, deviation produced by nulli-
fication instructions might reflect either conscientious or malicious
motives, and it might produce either corrective or malignant effects on
the production of just outcomes.
The legal system provides some protection against malignant
deviation in that judges can overturn jury convictions that lack a foun-
dation in evidence and defendants can appeal to higher courts.42
These limitations on the jury's power to deviate may afford minimal
protection, however, for several reasons. First, they apply only to con-
victions, providing no recourse for malignant exculpatory deviation.
40. See, e.g., GEORGE P. Fxmrcs-nn, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE 154-56 (1988); KENT
GREENAWALT, CoNFLuCTS OF LAW AND MoRAI.TY 360-67 (1987); Levine, supra note 33; Schef-
lin & Van Dyke, supra note 1.
41. This discussion suffers further complication because it is not always clear whether cor-
rective or perfecting nullification is understood as acquitting those who are legally guilty but
morally blameless, or those who are guilty by the letter but not the spirit of the law (i.e., guilty of
violating a specific offense definition but not in a manner that transgresses the broader principles
underlying the legal system). See infra notes 130-42 and accompanying text.
42. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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Second, although judges have the authority to set aside jury convic-
tions unsupported by evidence, they are unlikely to do so in cases in
which the evidence was sufficient to preclude dismissal prior to send-
ing the case to the jury for deliberation.43 Similarly, the appellate
courts' deferential standard of review regarding determinations of fact
renders reversal on the basis of insufficient evidence unlikely in cases
in which the evidence was sufficient to get to the jury."
Finally, the available empirical evidence suggests that deviation
may often occur in the form of indirect or subconscious "nullification"
when the jury addresses difficult factual determinations. 45 Thus, the
combination of nullification instructions and difficult evidentiary judg-
ments may create a particularly dangerous potential for malignant
deviation because the instructions weaken the constraints on the jury
to confine themselves to the evidence in circumstances in which the
evidence is sufficiently ambiguous to be subject to distortion by bias
and to preclude correction of erroneous verdicts by judges or appel-
late courts. Malignant inculpatory deviation resulting from nullifica-
tion instructions in these circumstances would effectively shift the
burden of proof by a substantial standard to the defendant because
judges and appellate courts apply a very deferential standard in deter-
mining whether to override jury verdicts on the basis of insufficient
evidence.46
The review of available empirical evidence provides no clear res-
olution to the central disputes of the consequentialist arguments. The
data base is relatively small, and the studies reflect methodological
limitations that warrant caution in extrapolating firm conclusions
about criminal trials. The available data suggests that nullification in-
structions and arguments addressing nullification by attorneys during
trials would alter both verdicts and deliberations by rendering them
less rule-bound. The degree to which these changes would promote or
undermine just outcomes remains clouded. The possibility that differ-
ent nullification instructions could increase just outcomes by promot-
ing corrective nullification while discouraging malignant deviations
43. FED. R. CRim. P. 29 (applying the same standard for judgment of acquittal before sub-
mission to the jury or after the jury is discharged).
44. STEVEN A. CimDSs & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW § 9.01
(2d ed. 1992).
45. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
46. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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remains open.47 Unfortunately, the possibility that nullification in-
structions would promote both corrective nullification and malignant
deviations also remains open. Finally, the tendency of such instruc-
tions to decrease the degree to which juries restrict their deliberations
to the evidence might increase the effect of bias or animosity, increas-
ing the probability of malignant deviation in relation to either correc-
tive nullification or rule-based verdicts. Purely legal or normative
debate is unlikely to resolve this consequentialist dispute because it
rests heavily on open empirical premises.
In summary, jury deviation occurs when a jury's verdict deviates
from that which is most consistent with the judicial instructions as ap-
plied to the evidence. Jury deviation might take the form of a deliber-
ate decision, or it might occur accidentally due to, for example, a
misunderstanding of instructions or evidence or an unintended bias in
interpretation. It might be exculpatory or inculpatory in effect, and it
might be conscientious or malicious in motive. Finally, it might serve
a corrective function by promoting just outcomes, or it might consti-
tute a malignant influence that renders outcomes less just.
As usually advocated, jury nullification constitutes an exercise of
conscience, and as such, it must be deliberate. Although an act of
conscience may be misguided, it must involve an attempt to do what
one believes one ought to do rather than an act of malice. Thus, it is
analytic in the concept of jury nullification as an act of conscience that
deviation qualifies as nullification only if it is deliberate rather than
accidental and conscientious rather than malicious.48
Although commentators intend to promote just outcomes when
they call for nullification instructions specifying exculpatory nullifica-
tion, neither just outcomes nor exculpatory verdicts are analytic in the
concept of deliberate, conscientious deviation from law. Whether
conscientious nullification or nullification instructions produce, on
balance, exculpatory or inculpatory verdicts and corrective or malig-
nant outcomes remain open empirical questions.49 The preliminary
47. Some evidence indicates, for example, that corrective instructions can reduce the le-
gally undesirable effects of hindsight bias. David B. Wexler & Robert F. Schopp, How and When
to Correct for Juror Hindsight Bias in Mental Health Law Malpractice Litigation: Some Prelimi-
nary Observations, 7 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 485, 487-89 (1989).
48. Martin Benjamin, Conscience, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIoETHIcs 469 (Warren T. Reich
rev. ed., 1995).
49. That is assuming some settled criteria of just outcomes. Absent such settled criteria,
this debate would involve both normative and empirical components.
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evidence suggests that exculpatory instructions promote both exculpa-
tory and inculpatory deviations.50 The corrective or malignant charac-
ter of these outcomes remains a question for normative inquiry, and
the deontic arguments constitute important components of this nor-
mative analysis.
2. The Deontic Argument from Democratic Self-Government
Arguably, any political system based on the principle of demo-
cratic self-government ought to openly endorse nullification and pro-
vide corresponding jury instructions. Democratic self-government
legitimizes government authority and coercion by vesting the decision
making power in the hands of the people who are subject to that au-
thority and coercive force. It discourages the abuse of power by mak-
ing officials answerable to the people, and it curbs the tendency to
pass oppressive laws by placing the lawmaking power in the hands of
the people who will be subject to the laws.
Advocates of nullification instructions might argue that just as
democratic elections discourage the abuse of power by legislators, nul-
lification can prevent abuse of power by prosecutors or judges. It can
also provide the mechanism through which the people can protect
themselves from unjust legislation by refusing to enforce it. Thus, nul-
lification provides for democratic self-rule by the people within the
criminal justice system.5' Jurors represent the people in this explicit
application of governmental coercive force by officials, assuring that
law will be used to limit the liberty of individual citizens only when the
circumstances render that use of force consistent with the will of the
people, whose consent through the democratic process legitimizes the
law.5 2 On this view, jury instructions that conceal the jury's power to
nullify undermine democratic self-rule in precisely the circumstances
in which it is most critical; that is, when the government intentionally
employs coercive force to limit individual liberty.
Opponents of nullification instructions can endorse democratic
self-rule by the people but reasonably question the application of this
principle to a jury, particularly one engaging in nullification. The
heart of democratic self-rule lies in the process by which the citizens
50. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
51. Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 1, at 93, 111.
52. This argument does not claim that individuals consent to the existence of the govern-
ment; that is, it does not imply a social contract justification for the existence of government.
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who are subject to the law select the laws that will limit their liberty.53
In this manner, the citizens collectively determine the limitations on
liberty they will accept. Each competent adult citizen has the oppor-
tunity to participate in the decisionmaking process, either directly
through pure participatory democracy or indirectly through elected
representatives. Thus, the people collectively limit their own liberty
to the extent they see fit.54
Clearly, the people at large do not vote on the criminal verdict. If
nullification constitutes an exercise of democratic self-rule, the jury
must, in some appropriate sense, represent the people more accu-
rately than does the legislature that passed the law nullified by the
jury. There is no reason to assume that either the jury or the legisla-
ture constitutes a representative sample of the electorate. Either body
might diverge significantly from the electorate in distribution of eco-
nomic, demographic, occupational, religious or other characteristics.
Representativeness in this sense is not directly relevant to democratic
self-rule, however, because the notion of self-rule in a representative
democracy involves citizens delegating their authority to representa-
tives by participating in the selection of those representatives. 55 It
would be perfectly consistent with the principle of representative de-
mocracy for a group of citizens to select a representative who pos-
sesses demographic characteristics that differ markedly from theirs. It
would not be consistent with these principles, however, for the gov-
ernment to deny them the opportunity to select their own representa-
tive by appointing one for them on the basis of demographic
similarity.
Juries are selected by the court and the lawyers from among a
panel and jury wheel gathered from a larger source such as voter re-
gistration lists. 56 Although the participants in the case can exclude a
few potential jurors for cause or through peremptory challenges, they
cannot positively select jurors.57 Thus, neither the specific partici-
pants in the case nor the people at large have the opportunity to select
their representatives on the jury. Nullification involves a decision by
this group of citizens, who have not been selected by the participants
or by the electorate at large as their representatives, to refuse to apply
53. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
54. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 375 n.7 (1963).
55. Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231,250 (1966); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555; Gray, 372 U.S. at
375 n.7.
56. LAFAVE & IsRAEL, supra note 13, § 22.2.
57. Id. § 22.3.
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the law as passed by the legislature which was elected by the electo-
rate. For this reason, it is difficult to support nullification as an appli-
cation of the principle of democratic self-rule.
That the jury is not a democratically selected body does not un-
dermine its legitimate role when it applies the law. When the jury acts
as a buffer between the individual and the coercive power of the state
by preventing overreaching by "the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor
and.., the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge,"58 it demands that
officials meet all requirements of law before subjecting the individual
to state coercion. In this manner, it reinforces democratic self-rule by
assuring that officials conform to the law as passed by the elected leg-
islature. In contrast, when the jury nullifies, it prevents the officials
from applying the law as passed by that legislature. Other arguments
may justify nullification, but it is difficult to interpret this process as
one of democratic self-rule.
The justificatory force of democratic process lies partially in the
notion that individuals are only subject to those restrictions on their
liberty that they have had the opportunity to participate in develop-
ing. Nullification undermines this principle in two ways. First, the
participants in the case (the defendant, the state, and the victim) are
subjected to judgment under standards which they have not had the
opportunity to vote on-either directly or indirectly by electing repre-
sentatives. 59 In light of the empirical evidence suggesting that nullifi-
cation instructions generate departures from the rules in the form of
both acquittals and convictions, the defendant might be convicted
under a standard that was not in effect when he engaged in the con-
duct for which he was charged. Moreover, that standard will have
been adopted by a jury which was not selected in an election in which
he had the opportunity to participate. Alternately, nullification that
results in an acquittal contrary to the law in effect at the time of the
offense deprives the victim of the protection afforded by the demo-
cratically established law. If the defendant is on trial for trespass on
private property as part of an act of civil disobedience, for example,
nullification that results in an acquittal retrospectively determines that
58. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
59. Although the victims are not technically parties in criminal cases, they are among the
persons most directly affected. See infra notes 171-73 and accompanying text regarding the ex-
pressive significance of nullification for the victim.
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this particular owner of private property does not merit the legal pro-
tection of property rights that the law ostensibly provides to all and
actually provides to other property owners.60
The second way in which nullification undermines the basic prin-
ciple of democratic self-rule involves the relationship of the jurors to
the standard they apply. In ordinary circumstances, democratic self-
rule allows citizens to collectively determine the limits they will define
on their own liberty. Legislators who establish criminal offenses are
then subject to prosecution for violating those provisions, and those
who establish defenses must accept the possibility that those defenses
will exculpate defendants who infringe on their interests.6' Jurors who
engage in nullification, however, do not subject themselves to the
standards they apply to the participants. Nullification does not consti-
tute a change in the law. Juries cannot invalidate a rule or establish a
new one through nuification.62 Therefore, jurors who nullify either
through acquittal or conviction subject the participants to standards
that they do not apply to themselves. In cases of civil disobedience
through trespass, for example, jurors who nullify would determine
that this particular property owner does not receive legal protection of
ordinary property rights, but they would retain that protection for
themselves.
In short, nullification deviates from democratic self-rule in sev-
eral ways that undermine any attempt to justify it as an exercise of
that principle. By engaging in nullification, jurors-who are not dem-
ocratically elected-reject laws established through a democratic pro-
cess in order to apply standards-to which they are not themselves
subject-to individuals who had no opportunity to vote in the process
by which these standards were selected. Although it is difficult to for-
mulate a plausible argument through which the principle of demo-
cratic self-government supports nullification, the possibility remains
that other important principles support the practice.
60. See infra notes 171-73 and accompanying text (discussing acquittals as ratifying defend-
ant conduct).
61. Some laws may exempt some sets of people, but criminal laws generally apply to the
population broadly, including the legislators who pass such laws.
62. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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3. The Deontic Argument from Deception and the Moral Force of
the Criminal Law
Although the criminal law prescribes punishment for those who
commit offenses in order to deter such conduct, deterrence constitutes
only one function of the criminal law. Legal punishment for infrac-
tions of the core rules of the criminal law expresses moral condemna-
tion, marking such conduct as unacceptable by the conventional
public morality of the society.63 Some theorists contend that the crim-
inal law directs behavior primarily by articulating a conventional pub-
lic morality intended to elicit endorsement and voluntary compliance
by most people.' Criminal law takes on conventional moral authority
to the extent that it represents widely held societal values. A criminal
justice system institutionalizes the conventional public morality when
it proscribes conduct considered wrongful in that society, applies stan-
dards of accountability consistent with those accepted by the popula-
tion, and administers punishment in a manner considered just by most
people. Such an institution expresses the community's moral stan-
dards and helps shape those standards because proscription of certain
types of conduct as criminal encourages the population to consider
such behavior wrongful. Furthermore, criminal conviction and pun-
ishment for such conduct marks an individual as one who has violated
social standards of acceptable behavior while meeting systemic stan-
dards of accountability.65
Deception in the administration of criminal justice undermines
the criminal law's standing as the embodiment of the conventional
public morality in at least two ways. First, those who discover this
deception may lose respect for the system, undermining its role as a
source of guidance for voluntary compliance by the majority. Citizens
63. Everett v. United States, 336 F.2d 979, 985-86 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Wright, J., dissenting);
JOEL FEImNERG, DoINo AD DESERVING 95-118 (1970); Robert F. Schopp, Justification Defenses
and Just Convictions, 24 PAC L.J. 1233, 1258-67 (1993). By "conventional public morality," I
mean those standards of morality which are widely accepted as binding in public life. These
standards are conventional rather than critical because they are established by wide acceptance
within a culture, rather than by critical argument demonstrating that they are correct or defensi-
ble. They address public morality in that they are understood in that culture as relevant to
conduct that falls within the public jurisdiction, rather than within a purely nonpublic domain.
See infra notes 84-101 and accompanying text (discussing the public and nonpublic domains in a
liberal society).
64. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 38-39, 86-88, 165, 193-98 (1961); HERBERT MOR-
RiS, ON GUILT AND NlNocF-NcE 33 (1976).
65. Robert F. Schopp, Self-defense, in IN HARM's WAY 255 (Jules L. Coleman & Allen
Buchanan eds., 1994); Schopp, supra note 63, at 1260-61.
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who become aware of the deception may no longer accept the crimi-
nal justice system as an embodiment of a public morality they en-
dorse, and therefore they will no longer grant any moral authority to
its prohibitions or to its expressions of condemnation. These people
would view the criminal justice system as merely the "gunman... writ
large. ' 66 Such an institution loses its capacity to guide behavior by
articulating moral standards for voluntary compliance, becoming
merely a source of coercion for those who fear arrest and punishment.
Second, the deception itself, independent of anyone's discovery
of it, renders the system a morally defective institution because it vio-
lates an important principle of the morality it represents according to
most plausible theories of political morality. Deception in the admin-
istration of criminal justice violates an important principle of any pub-
lic morality that values honesty, but it is a particularly serious
infraction in a liberal democracy. Liberal democracies establish sys-
tems of social cooperation that recognize distinct spheres of public
and nonpublic jurisdiction and that respect individual self-determina-
tion at both levels. First, persons exercise sovereignty over their own
lives individually and through voluntary nonpublic social interaction
within the nonpublic domain which receives protection from political
intrusion. Second, competent adult citizens may participate as equals
in the democratic process through which they establish and maintain
the central institutions of the public domain and authorize limits on
their liberty.67 Deception in the administration of the institutions of
the public domain undermines the individual's ability to participate
meaningfully in the political process that establishes and operates
those institutions, and it infringes on the individual's ability to order a
nonpublic life in a manner that prevents intrusion.
The argument from deception, as advanced by advocates of nulli-
fication instructions, takes a somewhat puzzling form. Advocates
frame the argument in terms of deception regarding the power to nul-
lify. They contend that current instructions deceive jurors regarding
this power by informing them that it is their responsibility to apply the
law as provided by the judge.68 They propose alternative instructions
that inform jurors of their power to acquit despite legal guilt in order
66. HART, supra note 64, at 80.
67. See infra notes 80-101 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of liberal
political morality and the public and nonpublic domains.




to avoid an inequitable or unjust result, and they contend that honesty
and the integrity of the process require such instructions. 69
Yet, these instructions also deceive jurors regarding their power
to deviate from judicial instructions. Honest instructions regarding
the jurors' power would inform them that "nothing bars you from ac-
quitting the defendant to avoid an unjust or inequitable result, as an
exercise of bias or hate, or for any reason you damn well please, in-
cluding no reason at all; furthermore, you can largely ignore the be-
yond reasonable doubt standard and convict anyone against whom the
state has entered significant evidence." The jury's power to acquit is
open ended, and its power to convict despite evidence that raises rea-
sonable doubt is broad due to the deferential standard of review.
The instructions proposed by advocates inform jurors of that sub-
set of their powers that advocates believe the jurors ought to exercise,
rather than of the complete scope of their power. These instructions
implicitly appeal to some justificatory theory in order to select the
limited range of reasons for nullifying that justify the exercise of the
power. In order to support nullification instructions that specifically
endorse some limited range of the complete power, such as nullifica-
tion based on appeal to conscience, justice, or mercy, one needs a nor-
mative argument to justify the grounds selected as falling within the
authority of the jury.
The plausible form of the argument from deception contends that
current instructions are defective, not because they fail to inform ju-
rors of all possible options, but because they deceive jurors by con-
cealing from them options that fall within the scope of their legitimate
authority. Thus, those who advocate nullification instructions on the
basis of the argument from deception must establish not only that de-
ception undermines the moral force of the criminal law, but also that
the current instructions deceive jurors regarding the scope of their le-
gitimate authority.
Standard instructions inform jurors that they must apply the law
as they receive it from the judge.70 The current power to nullify ren-
ders these instructions deceptive if one understands them as informing
jurors that they will not be allowed to depart from the law as stated by
the judge or that they will be penalized for doing so. If, however, one
69. Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 1, at 54-55; Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 3, at 183.
70. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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understands these instructions as informing jurors regarding their re-
sponsibility to apply the law rather than any putative inability to de-
part from it, then the mere, power to nullify is not sufficient to render
them deceptive.7' Thus, the claim that current instructions deceive
the jury regarding their legitimate authority requires independent ar-
gument establishing not only that juries have the power to nullify, but
also that the discretion to exercise this power falls within the scope of
their authority. Courts and commentators sometimes frame this issue
as a question regarding whether the jury has not only the power to
nullify, but also the right.72
D. NULLIFICATION AS A POWER AND AS A RIGHT
If X has a right to do act A, then all Y against whom X holds this
right have a duty not to interfere with X's doing A.73 Standard jury
instructions lead jurors to believe that they must apply the law as they
receive it from the judge, and research indicates that this belief ren-
ders them less likely to nullify. Thus, the instructions apparently in-
terfere with nullification, at least in the sense that they prevent jurors
from nullifying as often as they would with instructions explicitly ac-
knowledging this power.74 It appears, then, that if jurors have a right
to nullify, standard instructions burden the exercise of that right by
directing them in such a manner as to render them less likely to exer-
cise it. By parallel reasoning, if defendants have a right to have their
cases decided by jurors who are aware of their right to nullify, stan-
dard instructions burden this right. If nullification constitutes a right
as well as a power, therefore, standard instructions undermine the
moral force of the criminal law by informing the jury about its respon-
sibilities in a manner that interferes with its ability to exercise this
right.
The force of this argument requires independent argument estab-
lishing that the jury's power to nullify also represents a right to do so.
According to one view, the power without a legal remedy available to
71. Some jury instructions frame the juror's role in terms of "it is your duty" rather than or
in addition to "you must." See, &g., 4 OJI § 4.03.03 (1995); NJI 2d Crim. § 9.1(2) (1992). It
remains an open empirical question whether jurors understand such instructions differently than
they understand those framed as "you must."
72. Scott, supra note 6, at 391-92, 424; Simson, supra note 3, at 523-25.
73. WESLEY N. HoinmLD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 36-38 (Walter W. Cook
ed., 1964) (1919).
74. II OXFORD ENGLISH DiCinONARY 1462 (compact ed.. 1977) (to interfere is "to come
into collision or opposition, so as to affect the course of [or] to interpose, take part, so as to affect
some action"). Interference implies opposition, but not necessarily violence.
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address the exercise of that power establishes the right.75 It is not
clear whether those who support this view claim that the power with-
out the remedy constitutes the right or that it gives rise to the right,
but they contend that the jury's power to nullify absent any remedy
for the exercise of that power establishes the right to do so. They do
not identify any special property of the power of nullification that pro-
duces the corresponding right. It appears, therefore, that this claim
rests on the more general assertion that legal powers without reme-
dies either constitute or give rise to rights to exercise those powers.
If powers without legal remedies generate rights in this manner,
then any power without a remedy generates corollary duties not to
interfere. If X owns Blackacre in fee simple, X has the legal power to
sell all or part of his property rights in Blackacre, altering his legal
relationship to Blackacre and that of the buyer. Suppose X issues an
offer to W, Y, and Z to sell Blackacre for 100,000 dollars to the first of
the three who communicates firm acceptance of this offer. This offer
creates powers in each person W, Y, and Z regarding Blackacre. Each
of them has the legal power to acquire property rights in Blackacre
and to obligate X to sell Blackacre by responding to the offer with a
firm acceptance before any of the others complete such an acceptance
or X revokes the offer. Yet, W, Y, and Z do not have rights to acquire
property rights in Blackacre because others have no duty not to inter-
fere with their exercise of these powers. X can interfere by withdraw-
ing the offer before any of the offerees respond, and W, Y, and Z can
all interfere with one another by responding more quickly, preventing
the others from exercising the power the offer created in them.76 In
short, X creates a power without a remedy for the exercise of that
power but not a right in W, Y, and Z, demonstrating that powers with-
out remedies do not necessarily entail corresponding rights with corol-
lary duties not to interfere.
Similarly, if legal powers without remedies entail rights, then by
the logical relationship of contraposition, if X lacks the right to do act
A, then X must lack the power to do A without a remedy.77 Yet, X
clearly lacks the right to sell Blackacre to Y, because Y can interfere
by refusing to buy, and Z can interfere by offering Y a better deal on
75. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 172-74 (1895) (Gray, Shiras, JJ., dissenting);
GREENAWALT, supra note 40, at 361 (quoting, but not supporting, Chancellor James Kent).
76. Jom, D. CAr.AMi & JOSEPH M. PERmLo, TnE LAW OF CoNTRAcrs § 11 (3d ed.
1987) (discussing conditional contracts).
77. SIMoN BLscKtuRN, THE OxroRD DicroNARY oF PmLosoPHY 81 (1994) (defining
contrapositive).
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Whiteacre. However, this lack of a legal right, with its corollary duties
not to interfere, does not negate X's power to sell Blackacre to Y
without remedy for doing so.
Some might argue that the power does entail the right in these
hypotheticals because, for example, the right that W, Y, and Z take
from X's offer to sell Blackacre is not the right to buy Blackacre, but
rather the right to compete with the other two. Thus, the right does
not entail freedom from any kind of interference, but freedom from
interference of a type that falls beyond the scope of the competition.
One might suggest a similar interpretation, however, of nullification.
That is, one might contend that by recognizing the power to nullify
but withholding instructions, the system recognizes a right to nullify
when the jury initiates nullification on its own, but not a right to the
positive inducement of instructions. These interpretations import nor-
mative conclusions about the legitimate scope of the powers and
rights in question into the descriptions of those powers and rights.
The point here is that any attempt to resolve this issue through
purely analytic inquiry into the conceptual relationship between pow-
ers and rights frames the analysis inappropriately. The debate be-
tween those who endorse explicit nullification instructions and those
who oppose such instructions cannot be resolved through purely ana-
lytic argument because it is a normative dispute regarding the author-
ity that the criminal justice system ought to vest in the jury.78 In order
to resolve that issue, one must advance a justification for vesting a
particular scope of authority in the jury. A justification supporting the
authority to nullify within a particular criminal justice system must
appeal to principles that are consistent with those supporting the
broader set of legal institutions within which that system is
embedded79.
This argument does not establish that juries do not or should not
have the authority to nullify; rather, it demonstrates that we cannot
derive this authority merely from their having the power. Perhaps
more importantly, if one could show that this particular legal power
entails the corresponding legal right, that demonstration would not
78. HoBnuL, supra note 73, at 43 (making a similar point regarding privileges not entail-
ing rights and discussing whether there should be such a right as a separate question of justice
and policy).
79. One could, of course, then debate the separate question about the justification for that
broader political theory, but that project would extend beyond the scope of this Article.
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resolve the normative question regarding the justification of nullifica-
tion according to persuasive principles of political morality that under-
lie the criminal justice system. From the normative perspective, the
demonstration that this particular power entails the right would be
equally consistent with the conclusions that either we ought to explic-
itly recognize the right through instructions or that we ought to extin-
guish the power. If we were effectively unable to extinguish the
power, this would support the interpretation of the nullification power
as a mere artifact of other properties of the system, such as the refusal
to inquire into the basis of jury verdicts and the prohibition on double
jeopardy.
If the applicable principles of political morality justify vesting the
authority to nullify in the jury, current instructions undermine those
principles and deceive jurors regarding their responsibilities under
those principles. If these principles do not justify such authority, cur-
rent instructions neither deceive the jurors regarding their responsibil-
ities nor undermine the moral authority of the system. Thus, the
argument from deception requires logically prior normative argument
to support the contention that the moral principles that justify the
criminal justice system also justify vesting the jury with the authority
to nullify.
In summary, the consequentialist dispute regarding the likely ef-
fects of nullification instructions in promoting equal justice or anarchy
remains an open empirical inquiry. In order to resolve it, the dispu-
tants need both further empirical evidence and some mutually accept-
able criteria of justice and of anarchy. Both the analytic argument
that the power without a remedy entails the right and the deontic ar-
gument from democratic self-rule fail to provide the kind of support
that could justify the authority to nullify and mandate nullification in-
structions. The deontic argument from deception and the integrity of
the criminal justice system remains an open normative issue requiring
an account of the principles of political morality that would justify
vesting the authority to nullify in the jury as part of an integrated set
of political institutions.
IV. THE NORMATIVE STRUCTURE
Normative argument supporting or rejecting the jury's authority
to nullify in response to crimes of conscience must appeal to principles
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of political morality that justify the broader political structure, includ-
ing the criminal justice system. This argument must explain the legiti-
mate role, if any, of nullification as 'a component in a justified
institution of criminal justice. In the United States and other legal
systems representing the western liberal tradition, a normative argu-
ment supporting or rejecting a role for nullification must articulate the
broad general principles of liberal political morality and explain the
role of nullification in a complex set of legal institutions instantiating
these principles.
For the purpose of this Article, I set aside two issues. First, I
claim neither that liberal political theory is the most defensible polit-
ical morality nor that the criminal justice systems currently operating
in the United States are ideal legal institutions. I assume only that
liberal political morality and a criminal justice system reflecting these
principles can provide a defensible form of political organization. Pre-
sumably, those who hold that such institutions are necessarily indefen-
sible will find little significance in the role of any particular
component such as nullification. Second, I do not attempt here to de-
fend any particular liberal theory as the most defensible form of liber-
alism. Rather, I identify broad general properties that characterize
mainstream contemporary liberal political theories that provide a
philosophical foundation for legal systems such as those established in
the United States.
A. POLITICAL LIBERALISM
Theorists who advance variants of liberal political theory differ
regarding both their precise theoretical formulations and the structure
of political institutions they endorse.8 0 For the purpose of this Article,
I discuss two broad categories of liberal political morality. First, struc-
tural liberalism addresses the structure of basic political institutions in
a liberal society, reflecting principles of political justice that are com-
patible with a number of more general moral theories.81 Second, sub-
stantive liberalism constitutes a subset of structural liberalism in which
substantive moral principles common to the liberal political morality
and to the more general moral theory provide an intrinsic connection
between the political and more general theories.82 I make no attempt
80. See generally WiLL KYMICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE (1989) (dis-
cussing mainstream approaches to some of these issues).
81. See, e.g., JomN RAWLS, POLrTlCAL LmERAuSM (1993).
82. See, e.g., JOEL FEMNERG, HARM TO SELF (1986); JOSEPH RAz, THE MoRALrrY OF
FREEDOM (1986). Feinberg and Raz each advance theories of substantive liberalism, although
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to provide an exhaustive survey of contemporary liberalism, nor do I
claim that the structural and substantive categories provide the most
illuminating account for all purposes.8 3 Rather, this account provides
a useful framework for the analysis of the role of nullification and
necessity in a liberal society.
Structural liberalism describes and defends basic institutions of
political justice that provide a structure for a fair system of social co-
operation among individuals who endorse a variety of comprehensive
moral doctrines. Those who endorse various comprehensive moral
doctrines can differ with one another regarding a number of important
moral issues, principles and obligations, yet converge on certain prin-
ciples of political morality such that they can support mutually com-
patible liberal political institutions s4 These institutions establish and
protect public and nonpublic domains of jurisdiction. Citizens partici-
pate in and influence the public domain through democratic political
institutions that instantiate the shared principles of political morality
and protect the individual's discretion to pursue a broad range of
moral principles within the nonpublic domain.85
This political structure protects individual self-determination in
each domain. Democratic political institutions respect individual self-
determination by allowing each competent adult equal standing in the
political process by which citizens collectively determine the limits of
their own liberty and the boundaries of the public jurisdiction. John
Rawls identifies the capacities required to exercise a sense of justice
and develop a conception of the good life as the criteria of compe-
tence that render the individual eligible for the status of equal citizen-
ship. 6 These capacities enable each to participate in the political
process and to exercise an equal set of basic liberties. This equality of
Feinberg tends to emphasize more hehvily autonomy as a right to personal sovereignty, and Raz
emphasizes autonomy as an ideal development of the autonomous virtues. See infra notes 91-93
and accompanying text. I generally use Feinberg's theory as developed in the four volume work,
The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, as an example of substantive liberalism. This Article
draws primarily from Volume Three of that work, Harm To Self.
83. See, ag., Jean Hampton, Retribution and the Liberal State, 5 J. CONTEMp. LEGAL ISSUES
117 (1994) (providing an alternative account for a different purpose).
84. RAvLs, supra note 81, at Lect. I, §§ 1-3. Rawls refers to religious, moral, or philosophi-
cal comprehensive doctrines. I refer to all of these as moral doctrines in order to include those
systems or aspects of systems that people rely on to address moral questions regarding how we
ought to live.
85. Id. at Lect. I, § 6.
86. Id. at Lect. I, §§ 3.3, 5. Rawls identifies these capacities but does not refer to them as
criteria of competence. I refer to them in this manner because they fulfill the ordinary meaning
of competence as the capacities necessary for some role or function.
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standing in political institutions provides the basis for mutual respect
among citizens and for self-respect as a member of the political pro-
cess by each.87
Although liberal societies can differ regarding the precise bound-
aries of the public domain, they maintain some substantial sphere of
nonpublic life beyond the reach of government jurisdiction. This non-
public sphere allows each person the opportunity to develop and pur-
sue a conception of the good consistent with that person's
comprehensive moral doctrine through individual decisions and vol-
untary relationships with others. Thus, each competent adult defines
a life of his or her own through the manner in which he or she exer-
cises sovereign discretion in the nonpublic sphere and participates as
an equal citizen in the public domain. 88 In short, liberal political mo-
rality respects individual self-determination by recognizing each citi-
zen's equal standing in the democratic political process of the public
sphere and by protecting equal domains of nonpublic jurisdiction
within which each individual retains sovereign discretion.
A political structure grounded in liberal principles of political
morality differs from a mere political compromise insofar as its citi-
zens adopt a variety of comprehensive moral doctrines, each of which
recognizes as morally valuable the principles of political morality em-
bodied in liberal political institutions. Thus, citizens can differ regard-
ing their comprehensive moral doctrines and conceptions of the good
life, yet they can share common principles of political morality that
bind the political society.89 Those who endorse this liberal political
morality, which emphasizes distinct public and nonpublic domains and
the equal standing of competent citizens in the public sphere, are
structural liberals in the sense that their liberal principles address the
basic structure of political institutions.
87. Id. at Lect. V, § 7, Lect. VI, § 6.
88. i at Lect. I, §§ 5-6.
89. Id. at Lect. IV, §§ 3, 8, Lect. VIII, § 5. Consider, in contrast, circumstances in which a
society might agree on liberal political institutions as a mere political compromise. Suppose a
region was populated in roughly equal proportions by members of three different religious
groups, each of which endorsed as part of its comprehensive religious doctrine a political theoc-
racy in which all were required to adhere to that religion in all matters. If the members of each
group realized that they would not be able to enforce the theocracy they believed they ought to
establish, they might agree to liberal political institutions as a means of protecting themselves
from the establishment of a theocracy by one of the other religions. They would accept these
institutions only as a lesser evil, however, recognizing no moral value in them, and all would
stand ready to abandon liberal political institutions as valueless if circumstances developed that
allowed the theocracy they favored.
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Structural liberals can vary significantly in the content of their
comprehensive moral doctrines and in the manner in which their com-
prehensive doctrines support structural liberalism. Utilitarians, for ex-
ample, might vest instrumental moral value in liberal political
institutions if they accept plausible empirical hypotheses about human
psychology and social institutions, leading to the inference that liberal
political institutions are likely to maximize utility.9° Similarly, those
who hold a religious view that vests fundamental value in freely ac-
cepting a particular religious doctrine as God's word might support
liberal political institutions as providing the freedom of conscience
necessary to allow such free acceptance of that doctrine.
In contrast to the instrumental value recognized by the Utilitari-
ans and religious adherents just described, substantive liberals recog-
nize an intrinsic relationship between liberal political morality and
their comprehensive moral doctrine. Substantive liberals are struc-
tural liberals who vest fundamental value in individual autonomy as a
moral value that provides a common foundation for liberal political
institutions and for those aspects of their comprehensive moral doc-
trine that govern the nonpublic domain. Thus, the public and nonpub-
lic spheres each reflect respect for individual autonomy in their
respective domains of the person's life. Joel Feinberg, for example,
develops a complex conception of autonomy as a right to self-determi-
nation, a set of virtues, an ideal development of these virtues, and a
set of capacities. 91
At the level of political structure, the substantive liberal endorses
structural liberalism in which the status of equal citizenship in the
democratic political process represents respect for autonomy as a right
to self-determination in the public sphere. The protected nonpublic
domain provides the opportunity for each competent adult to exercise
the right to self-determination in the nonpublic sphere and to pursue
autonomous virtues by defining his life as an extended personal pro-
ject. Finally, the capacities for a sense of justice and the conception of
the good life that provide the basis for equal standing as a citizen in
liberal political institutions correspond roughly to the autonomous ca-
pacities that enable that individual to exercise autonomy as a right to
90. J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WmuiAms, UTTARr4NsM: FOR AND AGAINST (1973) (dis-
cussing utilitarianism as a comprehensive moral doctrine).
91. FEmERG, supra note 82, at 27-51.
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self-determination and to pursue a life reflecting the autonomous
virtues. 92
The substantive liberal emphasizes the right to self-determination
as a value that integrates the public and nonpublic domains.
Although structural liberals may vary in the parameters of the non-
public sphere they endorse, and in the reasons for which they endorse
it, they support distinct public and nonpublic domains. Substantive
liberals join other structural liberals in protecting the right to self-de-
termination as a right to equal standing in the political process of the
public sphere, and they vest fundamental value in self-determination
as personal sovereignty in the nonpublic domain. On this view, the
nonpublic domain provides the autonomous individual with a sphere
of personal sovereignty within which he exercises discretionary au-
thority analogous to the political sovereignty of nations. This right to
self-determination extends to a nonpublic domain of central self-re-
garding life decisions through which each individual defines and pur-
sues a life, providing an opportunity for each to develop the
autonomous virtues. Respect for personal sovereignty requires re-
spect for the individual's unfettered choice in matters that fall within
the nonpublic domain because they do not infringe on the legitimate
interests of others.93
For the substantive liberal, sovereignty is a fundamental value in
that it is absolute, underivative, and noncompensable. It is absolute in
the sense that discretionary authority within the domain of sover-
eignty is not subject to review, compromise, or limitation by the gov-
ernment. Various matters may fall beyond the scope of the
individual's sovereignty because, for example, they directly affect the
legitimate interests of others. If a decision falls within the domain of
individual sovereignty, however, respect for that person's right to self-
determination precludes any intrusion.94 Sovereignty is underivative
in that substantive liberals value it independently of any instrumental
purpose it may serve.95 Finally, it is noncompensable in that others
cannot justify intruding into a clearly competent individual's sphere of
92. Id. at 28-31; cf. RAwIs, supra note 81, at Lect. I § 3.3, Lect. VIII, § 3 (regarding the
capacity for a sense of justice).
93. FEINBERG, supra note 82, at 52-70.
94. Id. at 54-55.
95. They may also vest instrumental value in sovereignty in that, for example, they might
hold that respect for an individual's sovereignty promotes that person's ability to develop the
autonomous virtues and pursue the ideal. The point here, however; is that the value of sover-
eignty is not merely instrumental for the substantive liberal.
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sovereignty by providing other benefits, such as increased well-being
in return. 6
Although structural liberals who are not substantive liberals
might endorse personal sovereignty in the nonpublic domain as either
derivative or underivative, they join substantive liberals in protecting
individual sovereignty in the nonpublic domain from political interfer-
ence. Structural liberals must recognize sovereignty as absolute and
noncompensable because any politically sanctioned intrusion into an
individual's nonpublic domain would undermine the central distinc-
tion between public and nonpublic morality that enables structural lib-
erals to converge on common principles of political morality despite
differences in their comprehensive doctrines.
Liberal societies can vary in the precise boundaries they establish
between the public and nonpublic jurisdictions. Each liberal society,
however, must establish some set of political institutions that embody
the principles of political morality endorsed in that society and that
protect the nonpublic domain required by those principles. Any at-
tempt to justify political intrusion into an individual's domain of sov-
ereignty as established by the public morality would have to appeal to
some source of values external to that public morality in order to
override the shared principles of political justice. The shared princi-
ples of political morality provide good reasons to maintain distinct
public and nonpublic domains and they define the boundary between
the two spheres. Any justification for transgressing that boundary
must appeal to some other source of morally relevant reasons that
outweigh those shared principles of political morality. This appeal
would effectively endorse that alternate source of morally relevant
reasons as superior to the shared principles and to any comprehensive
doctrine that was not accepted as sufficient to override the public
morality.
Suppose, for example, that a particular society includes the com-
petent adult's right to accept or reject health care as part of the non-
public domain. Smith refuses a recommended course of treatment,
deciding to accept his approaching death as preferable to extending
his life at the expense of dehabilitating side-effects. If a court ordered
the treatment on the grounds that it would maximize the happiness of
all involved parties, it would effectively endorse a utilitarian compre-
hensive doctrine as a source of reasons sufficient to override the
96. FEi BERG, supra note 82, at 57-62.
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shared principles of political morality. This decision would undermine
the public-nonpublic distinction, endorse the utilitarian comprehen-
sive doctrine, and violate the equal standing in the political society of
Smith as well as of all those who held comprehensive doctrines other
than that deemed sufficient to override the shared principles of polit-
ical morality. Compensation with some other benefit, such as free
health care, would not cure the imputation of lesser standing. Thus,
structural liberals must treat individual sovereignty within the non-
public domain as absolute and noncompensable.
Contemporary liberal theorists advance specific theories that re-
flect the importance of self-determination as equal citizenship in the
public sphere and as sovereignty in the nonpublic domain. While
Feinberg presents the fundamental nature of sovereignty as part of the
very concept, John Rawls vests similar weight in self-determination by
granting lexical priority over other benefits to a set of basic liberties.
This set includes the political liberties to vote and be eligible for pub-
lic office; freedom of speech, assembly, conscience and thought; free-
dom of the person and the right to hold personal property; and
freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure.97
Feinberg advocates a sphere of personal sovereignty that encom-
passes all primarily and directly self-regarding critical life-decisions. 98
At this level of generality, the domain of sovereignty is identical for all
competent adults. Similarly, Rawls contends that the basic liberties
are the same for all members of society. He argues that the funda-
mental rights and liberties define the individual's standing in the pub-
lic sphere and provide the basis for self-respect as well as for respect
by others. On Rawls' view, self-respect is inextricable from respect
within a community of shared interests that confirms one's endeavors
and standing.9 9 At this fundamental level, self-determination and
equality converge because the government must treat persons with re-
spect-as beings capable of directing their own lives. The government
does this by according to each equal citizenship and participation in
the political process as well as a sphere of personal sovereignty which
equals that enjoyed by other members of the community and which
identifies the person as a member in full standing of that
community.100
97. RAWLS, supra note 81, at Lect. VIII, § 6; RAWLS, supra note 7, at 61, 243-51.
98. FEnERO, supra note 82, at 52-57.
99. RAwrs, supra note 81, at Lect. V, § 7, Lect. VIII, § 6; RAWLS, supra note 7, at 202, 440-
46, 544-46.
100. RONALD DwoRKN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-74 (1968).
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In short, contemporary liberal political theory supports political
institutions that provide a fair system of social cooperation among citi-
zens who may endorse a variety of comprehensive moral theories.
These institutions respect individual self-determination within distinct
public and nonpublic domains of jurisdiction. This requires a relation-
ship between the individual and the government in which the govern-
ment accords equal respect to all persons by recognizing each citizen's
equal standing in the democratic political process and by protecting a
sphere of sovereignty within which each individual can direct his or
her own life and develop self-respect as a member of a community of
equal, sovereign citizens. Although substantive liberals vest a more
comprehensive value in autonomy as a value fundamental to both the
public and nonpublic spheres, they share with other structural liberals
at least the following important commitments. They endorse liberal
political principles and institutions as morally valuable, rather than
merely as political compromise. They also maintain distinct public
and nonpublic domains, and they protect the equal citizenship of com-
petent adults in the public sphere as well as the sovereign control of
each citizen within the nonpublic domain.
The rule of law is central to this political philosophy in that law in
a liberal society defines and protects the boundaries of the public and
nonpublic domains and regulates the conduct of individuals and of the
governmental in the public sphere. Constitutional law limits the scope
of governmental power, preventing the government from directly in-
truding into the individual's domain of sovereignty and prohibiting the
government from distributing social resources and burdens in a man-
ner that imputes lesser status or worth to some people. Certain areas
of law, such as the law of contracts, wills, and family associations, fa-
cilitate the ability of individuals to order their voluntary associations.
Criminal law protects personal sovereignty and equal status by
proscribing, preventing, and punishing actions by some citizens that
violate the rights and interests of others. Thus, the criminal law not
only maintains the conventional public morality that orders coopera-
tive social interaction, it also articulates the contours of the individ-
ual's sphere of sovereignty by defining certain types of intrusions as
crimes.1 1 When a liberal state enforces the criminal law, it not only
101. Some types of activity might be criminalized for other reasons. Pejury, for example, is
proscribed in order to promote the effectiveness of the legal system, and securities regulations
are designed to promote an effective functioning of the economy. Crimes such as those against
person and property, however, help to define the individual's sphere of autonomy by forbidding
others from intruding into those areas.
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maintains the public order and safety through deterrence and re-
straint, it also vindicates the sovereignty of the victim by punishing
and condemning conduct which violates that person's right to self-
determination.
B. Tim CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THE LIBERAL SocirTY
The criminal law proscribes certain types of conduct and
prescribes punishment for those who are convicted of engaging in
those types of conduct under conditions of culpability as defined by
the code. By doing so, the criminal law guides social behavior through
several different mechanisms. Most obviously, it is intended to pre-
vent criminal conduct through incapacitation and deterrence.102 Per-
haps more importantly, however, it serves as an official representation
of an important part of the conventional public morality. As such, it
articulates boundaries of socially acceptable behavior in the public
sphere, providing guidelines for voluntary compliance by those who
accept a responsibility to conform to that conventional morality. To
the extent that the criminal law converges with standards widely held
among citizens, it is likely to be accepted as representative of the con-
ventional public morality, thus reinforcing those standards and help-
ing to shape them.
Insofar as the criminal law represents, reinforces, and shapes the
conventional public morality, the expressive function of the criminal
law may influence behavior more effectively than does the attempt to
direct conduct through enforcement. 10 3 The criminal law expresses
five types of condemnation at two different levels of analysis. First,
the criminal law expresses condemnation of certain categories of con-
duct at the institutional level by formulating criminal offense defini-
tions in a manner that prohibits those categories of conduct as
criminal and authorizes punishment of those who are convicted of vio-
lating those prohibitions. Second, at the level of application, convic-
tion for a particular offense expresses four additional types of
condemnation. In clear cases, conviction and punishment of a culpa-
ble defendant for a specific offense (1) reaffirms the institutional con-
demnation of conduct of this category, (2) condemns this particular
102. WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AusI W. SCOIT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5
(1986).
103. HART, supra note 64, at 38-39, 193-98. The enforcement process serves both as a direct
tool of coercive behavior control and as a means of communicating the expressive function.
Thus, to a certain extent, enforcement constitutes one means of expression. FEiNBERo, supra
note 63, at 95-118.
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instance of that category, (3) condemns the defendant as one who has
violated the prohibition represented by an offense definition under
conditions of culpability by systemic standards, and (4) condemns that
defendant as morally blameworthy for that offense.1°4
The criminal justice system reaffirms the standing of both the de-
fendant and the victim through the appropriate expression of condem-
nation. It reaffirms the standing of the defendant as a competent
citizen of the political sphere insofar as the requirements of criminal
responsibility limit criminal liability to those who violate the criminal
law while possessing the capacities of competent agents. By trying
and convicting the defendant in the criminal process rather than
resorting, for example, to the civil commitment process of the mental
health system, legal institutions treat the defendant as a citizen who
possesses the capacities required for equal standing in the political
sphere.10 5 In contrast, when the state refuses or neglects to prosecute
and punish violations against certain classes of citizens, such as prosti-
tutes or transients, this refusal or neglect effectively ratifies the impu-
tation of inferior status to these parties.
Criminal conviction and punishment of the defendant also vindi-
cate the standing of the victim. Criminal conduct against private per-
sons injures their concrete interests, such as those in safety and
property, and it violates their protected domain of sovereignty by in-
terfering with their discretionary control. The crime places the victim
and the aggressor in a relationship of relative inequality such that the
aggressor violates the victim's sovereignty in order to promote his
own interests, imputing lesser standing or importance to the victim.
Even unsuccessful attempts express the offenders' disregard for their
victims' standing. By convicting and punishing the criminal, the crimi-
nal justice system repudiates the imputation of lesser standing inher-
ent in the crime, reaffirming the status of the victim. The punishment
represents a public repudiation of the aggressor's violation of the vic-
tim's sphere of sovereignty and a public vindication of the victim's
standing as a sovereign person. 6
On this view, the government can violate an individual's sover-
eignty either directly or indirectly. First, it can do so directly through
104. Schopp, supra note 63, at 1258-64.
105. Robert F. Schopp, Sexual Predators and the Structure of the Mental Health System: Ex-
panding the Normative Focus of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1 PSYCHOL PUB. PoL'Y & L. 161,
177-80 (1994).
106. FEWBERG, supra note 63, at 104 (discussing the role of punishment in vindicating the
law).
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state action that transgresses the individual's right to self-determina-
tion by violating political freedoms or that imputes inferior status to
some through treatment that marks them as less important or worthy
of respect than others. Constitutional law protects citizens from such
direct violations. Second, the government can indirectly violate the
individual's standing as an equal, sovereign person by acquiescing in
criminal violations against that person by another. Insofar as the
criminal law defines and protects the contours of the nonpublic do-
main, government derogates one person's standing indirectly when it
subjects that person's sovereignty to violation by another by virtue of
the manner in which it defines, enforces, or fails to enforce the crimi-
nal law.
C. JUSTIFICATION DEFENSES
In certain unusual circumstances, violations of offense definitions
under conditions of responsibility do not warrant condemnation. Jus-
tification defenses serve as corrective devices, preventing conviction
and expression of condemnation in these circumstances. 0 7 Specific
justification defenses, such as self-defense, address relatively specific
circumstances in which conduct fulfills the material elements of of-
fense definitions, but does not warrant the condemnation ordinarily
associated with behavior of that type. The necessity defense serves as
a residual defense which applies to conduct that violates an offense
definition in conditions that neither qualify for a specific defense nor
justify condemnation.
Offense definitions represent general prohibitory norms of the
conventional public morality, but in contrast to those underlying
norms, they take the form of relatively specific behavioral direc-
tives. 0 8 That is, if one thinks of a conventional public morality as a
set of widely accepted moral principles regarding conduct that falls
within the sphere of public jurisdiction, then the general prohibitory
norms consist of general principles proscribing certain categories of
conduct as wrongful according to that conventional public morality.
In a liberal society, these might include, for example, general princi-
ples proscribing conduct that physically harms another person, vio-
lates their property rights, or infringes on their legitimate sphere of
personal discretion.
107. DRESSLRm, supra note 12, § 22.01; PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 24
(1984).
108. Schopp, supra note 63, at 1264-69.
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Legal offense definitions take the form of more specific behav-
ioral directives that are intended to give more definite notice to citi-
zens and to constrain the latitude of legal decision makers. The
offense definitions prohibiting various types of homicide and assault,
for example, all provide more specific behavioral directives represent-
ing the general prohibitory norm stating the conventional moral prin-
ciple that one ought not physically harm other persons.10 9
Justification defenses represent exceptions to the general prohibi-
tory norms. That is, they provide for acquittal when a defendant has
fulfilled the elements of an offense definition under circumstances in
which other principles of the conventional public morality override
the general prohibitory norm represented by the offense definition.
In such circumstances, the defendant's conduct violates an offense
definition representing one prohibitory norm, but it does not merit
condemnation under the comprehensive set of principles constituting
the conventional public morality.110 Self-defense, for example, pro-
vides a justification defense to an assault charge if the defendant pur-
posely injured another person in circumstances in which doing so was
necessary in order to prevent that other person from unlawfully injur-
ing the defendant.1 '
Such a statutory system reflects an underlying conventional mo-
rality that includes some combination of moral principles which can
override the previously stated principle prohibiting conduct that
causes physical harm to other persons. The precise parameters of the
exceptions represented by the law of self-defense will vary according
to the particular combination of overriding moral principles in a par-
ticular conventional morality and as a function of the practical consid-
erations, including error preference and the need for generality and
decidability, that play a more important role at the level of legal for-
mulation than at the level of abstract moral principle.1 2
Thus, a criminal code containing typical assault, homicide and de-
fensive force provisions would represent a conventional public moral-
ity in roughly the following manner. The offense definitions for
various categories of homicide and assault would instantiate a general
109. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.1-A, 211.1 (Official Draft and Revised Comments, 1985)
(describing homicide and assault as causing various levels of physical harm).
110. Schopp, supra note 63, at 1264-69.
111. Id. at 1266; MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 109, § 3.04.
112. Schopp, supra note 65, at 273-76.
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principle that one ought not cause physical harm to other human be-
ings. The statutes allowing the use of force in defense of self, others,
or property would represent the principle that one ought to prevent
unnecessary injury to innocent persons. The integrated conventional
public morality would hold that one ought not cause physical harm to
another person unless doing so is necessary to protect innocent per-
sons from unlawful force or to serve some other overriding principle
in the conventional morality. In certain circumstances it would grant
priority to the principle endorsing protection of the innocent over the
principle proscribing the use of force.
The criminal law would contain a series of specific offense defini-
tions and justification defenses designed to instantiate these general
principles in the form of specific behavioral directives addressing
homicide, assault, self-defense, defense of others and property, the use
of force in law enforcement, and so on.113 These specific provisions
might include various clauses regarding proportion, retreat, immi-
nence, or other considerations intended to accurately represent the
conventional public morality in light of practical considerations such
as the need for relative generality, decidability, predictability, and
simplicity, as well as a concern for error preference." 4
Ideally, a complete set of offense definitions and justification de-
fenses would provide a complete set of conduct rules representing a
fully articulated conventional public morality. The offense definitions
would address all conduct violating the underlying prohibitory norms
in such a manner as to accurately represent the relative severity of
offenses, and the justification defenses would accommodate all possi-
ble circumstances generating exceptions to the prohibitory norms by
appealing to the other principles contained in the conventional public
morality.
Realistically, no set of criminal offense definitions and justifica-
tion defenses will completely represent the underlying conventional
public morality and all possible relevant circumstances. According to
one common interpretation, the necessity defense serves as a residual
justification defense that addresses cases in which the defendant's con-
duct fulfills the elements of an offense definition, yet it does not merit
condemnation by the criminal justice system because the prohibitory
113. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 109, §§ 210 (homicide), 211.1 (assault), 3.03-07 (spe-
cific justification defenses).
114. Id. § 3.04 (self-defense); Schopp, supra note 65, at 273-76.
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norm underlying the offense definition is overridden by other princi-
ples in the conventional public morality in a manner that has not been
articulated in the form of a specific legal defense. Thus, the defense
serves as a residual corrective device in the sense that it provides a
defense with which the courts can adjust the legal verdict in order to
render it consistent with the conventional public morality represented
by the law, in the absence of an applicable specific legal defense." 5
V. NULLIFICATION AND NECESSITY IN A
LIBERAL SOCIETY
A. DECEPTION AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM
Recall the argument from deception and the moral force of the
criminal law.11 6 Jury instructions that mislead jurors about their re-
sponsibilities or legitimate options in the criminal process undermine
the moral force of that process. Such deception distorts one of the
primary functions of the criminal law in that it undermines the law's
role as an expression of the conventional public morality that elicits
voluntary compliance from the majority. On the consequentialist ar-
gument, the loss of moral force in the eyes of those who learn of the
deception dilutes the putative justification for the misleading instruc-
tions and for the broader institutions of criminal punishment because
it weakens the expressive function, rendering voluntary compliance
less likely and thus rendering the system less effective in preventing
conduct that violates the conventional public morality." 7
According to the deontic argument, deception of jurors regarding
their responsibilities strikes at the core of the principles of political
morality that justify the larger system of legal institutions in a liberal
society. It does so by distorting the parameters of the conventional
public morality in which citizens can recognize common moral
ground, regardless of differences in their comprehensive doctrines.
Such deception distorts a central legitimate jury function, and it vio-
lates the standing of the jurors and of the participants. It interferes
with the legitimate jury function by impairing the jury's ability to hold
the government to the conventional public morality. It undermines
the jury's ability to fulfill its duty to assure that government wields
coercive power against the individual only as it is authorized by the
115. DRnssr.nR, supra note 12, § 22.01; GREENAWALT, supra note 40, at 286-310.
116. See supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
1996] 2079
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:2039
law representing the conventional public morality. It violates the ju-
rors' standing as responsible citizens of the public institutions by inter-
fering with their ability to fulfill their responsibility as full participants
in the conventional public morality. Finally, it violates the standing of
the defendant and of the victim by subjecting them to a distorted ver-
sion of the public morality rather than to the system of law that repre-
sents the conventional morality in the liberal society, the development
of which they had the opportunity to participate in as members of the
electorate. 18
In short, deceptive jury instructions constitute a serious violation
of the principles of political morality supporting a liberal society.
Common jury instructions inform a jury that they must apply the law
as the judge describes it or that it is their duty to do so." 9 These
specific instructions are consistent with the liberal political morality in
that they instruct the jury to apply the conventional public morality to
the defendant's conduct that falls within the public domain. Absent
additional instructions regarding the necessity defense or nullification,
these instructions violate the liberal political morality if, but only if,
the principles of that political morality justify vesting authority in the
jury to invoke the necessity defense or nullification as legitimate re-
sponses within the public domain to defendants who have committed
crimes of conscience. Thus, in order to establish that current jury in-
structions violate the conventional public morality of a liberal society
by deceiving the jurors regarding their responsibilities, one must
demonstrate that the principles of this public morality justify the ne-
cessity defense or nullification as intrasystemic responses to these of-
fenses. This requires, in turn, that one establish the legitimate
functions of each and the relationship between the two.
B. NULLIFICATION AND NECESSrrY
Theoretical interpretations of nullification and necessity some-
times render it difficult to clearly distinguish the functions of each,
particularly as applied to crimes of conscience. Mortimer and Sanford
Kadish, for example, interpret necessity as a defense accommodating
legitimated disobedience by citizens. According to this theory, citi-
zens raise the necessity defense when they claim that their violations
of specific rules were justified in the circumstances by the goals and
118. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing jury instructions framed in terms
of "you must" or "it is your duty to").
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ends of the system in which those rules are embedded. The courts
review these claims and the conduct in question in order to confirm or
reject the defendants' contentions that the goals and ends of the sys-
tem justified their conduct in the circumstances. Other commenta-
tors articulate compatible interpretations of the necessity defense as a
corrective device in the criminal law. Some articulate this function in
terms of violating the letter of the law in order to serve the spirit of
the law.12 1 Although the language varies somewhat across accounts,
these commentators converge on a common interpretation of the ne-
cessity defense as an unspecified justification defense designed to
serve as a corrective device. It applies in circumstances in which of-
fense definitions and the lack of an applicable specific legal defense
would generate a conviction for engaging in conduct that was more
consistent than any available alternative behavior with the principles
and purposes of the conventional public morality represented by the
criminal law.
As previously discussed, jury nullification consists of deliberate,
conscientious, jury deviation. Those who endorse nullification instruc-
tions would inform jurors that nothing bars them from departing from
the law in order to acquit a defendant if they determine that applying
the law to the facts would produce an inequitable or unjust result.'2
Kadish and Kadish discuss jury nullification as one type of legitimated
interposition by an official. As such, it is a departure from the rules of
the system that is justified as consistent with the goals and ends of that
system and independent of review by others. 23 Other commentators
characterize nullification as a perfecting or ameliorative device. 24
According to these interpretations of necessity and nullification,
both involve departures from specific legal rules in order to promote
the goals and ends of the broader legal system of which the rule is a
part. Necessity might appeal to the goals and ends of the system in a
narrower sense in that the defense has some legal structure and does
not apply when the legislature has preempted the issue. Nullification,
120. KADISH & KADISHI, supra note 24, at 120-27.
121. James L. Cavallaro, Jr., Note, The Demise of the Political Necessity Defense: Indirect
Civil Disobedience and United States v. Schoon, 81 CAtL L. REv. 351 (1993); DRESsLER, supra
note 12, § 22.01; GREENAWALT, supra note 40, at 286-310; GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHNKING
CRIMINAL LAv § 10.2 (1978).
122. See supra note 18 and accompanying text for nullification instructions.
123. KADIsH & KADISH, supra note 24, at 45-72 (discussing nullification as legitimated
interposition).
124. FLE-cmR, supra note 40, at 154-56 (perfecting); GREENAWALT, supra note 40, at 359-
67 (amelioration).
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in contrast, appeals to the principles underlying the criminal process in
more abstract terms such as justice or fairness. Both are intrasys-
temic, however, insofar as they are interpreted as correcting or
perfecting the system by accommodating deviation from some specific
clause of that system in circumstances in which deviation promotes
the ends or values of the system more effectively than would conform-
ity with that clause.
Kadish and Kadish address the two differently in that they ad-
dress necessity as a claim raised by a citizen whose judgment is subject
to review by officials, but discuss nullification as deviation by an offi-
cial who is not subject to review or sanction.'25 Some commentators
endorse each as a jury response to some crimes of conscience, how-
ever, and each constitutes an alternative to conviction that jurors
might invoke in some cases. 26 What is the relationship between the
two as jury decisions? What differentiates necessity and nullification
when both are considered as jury responses to citizen conduct? Both
involve acquittal of a defendant for conduct that fulfills offense ele-
ments in the absence of any specific defense. When interpreted as
corrective devices in the legal system, both are intrasystemic insofar as
they appeal to the purposes and values of the system for support, yet
necessity is an explicitly recognized component of the system while
nullification is at most an implicit component and perhaps a deviation
from the system or a mere artifact of other components of that system.
On the corrective interpretation, nullification grounded in the claim
that the defendant's conduct was justified by the broader purposes
and values of the system seems to collapse into the necessity defense.
C. NEcEssrY
The necessity defense provides a residual justification defense
that functions as a corrective device by allowing exculpation through
appeal to justificatory principles contained in the conventional moral-
ity embodied in the law. Statutes and cases recognize the defense in
circumstances in which the defendant engaged in some ordinarily ille-
gal conduct reasonably believed to be necessary in order to avoid
some imminent, legally recognized harm. 27 The defendant bears the
burden of production regarding the requirements of the defense, and
125. KAnisH & KADISH, supra note 24, at 45-72, 120-27.
126. See, ag., Lippman, supra note 1 (necessity); Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 1
(nullification).
127. DRSSLER, supra note 12, § 22; ROBiNSON, supra note 107, § 124.
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the court determines whether the defendant has met that burden by
providing evidence regarding each element such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict based on the defense.'28 Courts have consist-
ently denied the defense in cases of political protest on various
grounds including: the evil avoided was remote and speculative rather
than imminent; the illegal conduct was not reasonably calculated to
abate the anticipated harm; legal alternatives were available in the
form of political or judicial action; the legislature preempted the issue
in setting the law or policy in question; or the "evil" avoided could not
constitute a legally recognized evil because it consisted of the exercise
of a legally recognized right.1 29
Some commentators contend that these decisions invade the
province of the jury.' Some requirements of the defense clearly de-
pend on issues of fact. Did the defendants reasonably believe, for ex-
ample, that the event they identified as the harm to be avoided wasimminent and that their illegal conduct was likely to abate the danger?
Regarding these requirements, courts appropriately determine
whether the defendants have met the burden of production. If the
defendants have met that burden, the trier of fact determines whether
they have met the burden of persuasion. Some commentators con-
tend that the courts have interpreted and decided these issues errone-
ously, but the distribution of responsibility is relatively clear.13" '
The appropriate distribution of responsibility regarding the deter-
mination of whether the events identified by the defendants as the
evils to be avoided can qualify as legally recognized greater evils for
the purpose of the necessity defense remains contentious. If one in-
terprets this question as one that addresses the conscience of the com-
munity in the sense of widely held personal moral beliefs within the
community, it appears to raise an issue of fact about the degree to
which the defendants' evaluations of the relative magnitude of the
evils in question would be endorsed by a consensus of community resi-
dents. 32 This interpretation suggests that the court should submit the
comparison of the evils performed and avoided to the jury and admit
empirical evidence regarding the opinions and attitudes of community
residents relevant to that balance of evils. Thus, a survey of public
128. ROBINSON, supra note 107, § 4.
129. DarssLER, supra note 12, § 22.03; Lippman, supra note 1, at 328-43; ROBINsoN, supra
note 107, § 124(d)(1).
130. Cavallaro, supra note 121; Lippman, supra note 1, at 343-56.
131. Cavallaro, supra note 121, at 372 n.129; Lippman, supra note 1, at 345-48.
132. Cavallaro, supra note 121.
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opinion regarding this particular case or the general issues involved
should qualify as relevant evidence.
If one understands the necessity defense as a residual corrective
device appealing to the principles of the conventional public morality
embodied in the law, in contrast, the evaluation of two events as the
greater or lesser evil raises an issue of legal interpretation. This ap-
proach explains the well-established doctrine of legislative preemption
and suggests that the balancing of evils falls within the jurisdiction of
the court. 133 According to this analysis of the defense, courts must
decide as a matter of law whether the events identified by the defend-
ants as evils to be av;oided can qualify as legally recognized evils, and
if so, whether these events would constitute greater evils than the ille-
gal conduct the defendants are charged with performing.
Courts have frequently adopted the latter interpretation and re-
lied on legislative preemption in cases of political protest.13 4 Having
construed the matter as one of legal interpretation, courts appropri-
ately adopt a deferential attitude toward legislators and higher courts.
Although theorists debate the precise nature and range of judicial au-
thority in reviewing legislation, the general responsibility of the court
to interpret and apply the law as passed by the legislature within the
bounds set by the Constitution is relatively widely accepted. Thus, the
review of a current law or policy for compliance with the Constitution
provides the systemically approved method by which courts test legis-
lative decisions by appeal to the principles of political morality repre-
sented by the legal system. If a court were to accept the necessity
defense in a case of political protest on the basis of its own determina-
tion that a constitutional statute or policy constitutes a greater evil by
systemic standards than a violation of a constitutional offense defini-
tion, it would violate the standards of that system regarding the scope
of its authority regarding legislative decisions.
The point here is not, of course, that legislative or executive deci-
sions within constitutional limits invariably converge with the best in-
terpretation of the substantive principles of the conventional public
morality represented by the law. Rather, that conventional morality
includes the procedural principles which define the legitimate roles
133. N.Y. PNMA LAW § 35.05 (McKinney 1987); MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 109,
§ 3.02(1)(c); ROBINSON, supra note 107, § 124(d)(1) (law or policy as conclusive evidence of the
community view).




and authority of each branch, and thus, a court that independently
evaluated a constitutionally valid law or policy for consistency with its
interpretation of the conventional public morality or that subjected
such a law or policy to review by the jury would in doing so violate its
responsibilities under those principles. Thus, insofar as the necessity
defense qualifies as an intrasystemic corrective device that appeals to
the conventional public morality represented by the law, the court ap-
propriately applies it in light of the procedural principles that require
it to interpret and apply, rather than independently evaluate, constitu-
tional law and policy.
According to this interpretation of a court's responsibility regard-
ing the determination of greater evils for the necessity defense, the
court must evaluate the relative magnitude of the evils at issue accord-
ing to the principles of public morality represented by the law. Some
cases raise no concern about the legitimate scope of the court's au-
thority. Suppose, for example, that a bicyclist on a remote country
road discovers an automobile that has run off the road into a tree.
The driver suffered a heart attack, causing the accident and now has
additional injuries caused by the crash. If the bicyclist breaks into the
only nearby farmhouse in order to telephone for an ambulance be-
cause that is the only way to secure immediate assistance for the
driver, the court must determine whether the principles represented
by the law support the bicyclist's contention that breaking and enter-
ing constituted a lesser evil than allowing the driver to die. Presuma-
bly, most courts would conclude that the criminal law's structure of
offenses and defenses, including those addressing homicide, assault,
self-defense, defense of others and property, and illegal entry repre-
sent underlying principles that value the protection of innocent life
more highly than prevention of relatively minor violations of property
rights.
Other cases, particularly those involving civil disobedience or
conscientious resistance to some law or policy, raise questions regard-
ing the limits of the courts' authority to review law. Defendants who
claim the necessity defense regarding crimes committed for the pur-
pose of preventing women from securing legal abortions, for example,
ask courts to find that the exercise of a legally protected right consti-
tutes an evil to be avoided. Some defendants who claim the necessity
defense regarding crimes committed in protest of nuclear energy pol-
icy ask courts to find that the pursuit of the policy at issue is likely to
produce effects that constitute harms to be avoided. These cases raise
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two distinct types of questions with different ramifications for the
courts.1 3 5
Consider first the case in which the exercise of the legal right con-
stitutes the putative harm to be avoided. If the relevant statutes per-
mit the abortions in question and higher courts have concluded that
these statutes and procedures are constitutional, the lower court lacks
authority under the conventional public morality represented by the
law to consider the exercise of rights recognized by these statutes as
evils to be avoided through criminal conduct. This conclusion does
not reflect the premise that the legislature and higher courts must be
correct in their assessment of substantive values embodied in the con-
ventional public morality. Rather, it reflects the procedural principles
of the law-making and enforcing process that establish the boundaries
of authority in public institutions instantiating that public morality. It
would be perfectly consistent for a trial court judge to conclude that
the legislature and the Supreme Court were wrong in their interpreta-
tions of the substantive principles of the public morality, but that the
procedural principles defining the limits of the trial court's authority
precluded it from correcting or acting contrary to this error.136
The second case might occur in either of two variations. First, the
protestors who claim the necessity defense might simply disagree with
the legislative assessment of risks and benefits regarding the nuclear
energy policy. The legislature might have considered evidence that
the risk of a melt-down was one in one million, for example, and con-
cluded that the expected benefits were worth the risks. The protestors
might simply disagree, concluding that these benefits are not worth
the risk, and thus, that the balance of risks over benefits produced by
the policy constitutes an evil to be avoided. This variation confronts
the trial court with circumstances very similar to those just discussed,
in that the protestors who claim the necessity defense ask the court to
assume a responsibility allocated to the legislature by the procedural
principles of the conventional public morality.
135. Recall that this discussion addresses only the existence and relative magnitudes of le-
gally recognized evils. It does not address other relevant questions such as imminence or reason-
able belief that the offense charged would prevent the evils.
136. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 405-14 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice
Blackmun's dissent in Furman denies the court's authority to override the legislature, although
he clearly considers the legislation misguided. See also Otey v. Stenberg, No. 4: CV 94-3191, slip
op. at 22 (D. Neb. filed Aug. 22, 1994) (Judge Urbom's opinion in Otey eloquently expresses the




Suppose, in contrast, that the protestors blockade the gate to the
nuclear energy facility in order to prevent the delivery of fuel that
would allow activation of the reactor which they claim differs from
that considered by the legislature such that it poses a one in one thou-
sand probability of a melt-down, rather than the one in one million
probability considered by the legislature. Considering only the issue
of relative magnitude of harm, these protestors do not ask the court to
override the legislative assessment of the relative magnitude of evils.
Rather, they ask the court to balance the harm of a trespass against
this level of risk because the legislature had never considered this
question. That is, they ask the court to make a determination accord-
ing to the substantive principles of the conventional public morality in
circumstances that do not raise issues of authority under the proce-
dural principles. In this manner, this second variation of the nuclear
protest case resembles the bicyclist case more closely than it resembles
either the abortion case or the first variation of the nuclear protest
case.
This approach to the necessity defense is consistent with liberal
principles of political morality in that the court subjects the partici-
pants to a determination of the lesser evil according to the principles
of public morality embodied in the law as established through the
democratic institutions of the public jurisdiction. Although either the
legislature or the court may make an erroneous determination in a
particular case, the allocation of authority conforms to the procedural
principles of the conventional public morality, and the resulting jury
instructions involve no deception of the jurors regarding their respon-
sibilities as jurors within the conventional public morality.
Some might object, however, that the necessity defense should
justify conduct that qualifies as the lesser evil by the community con-
science in the sense of widely held personal beliefs rather than accord-
ing to the conventional morality represented by the law. According to
this view, the jury represents the community and should apply the
community conscience in deciding whether the conduct constituting
the offense qualifies as a lesser evil than that which it was performed
to avoid. 37
Jurors might represent the conscience of the community in at
least two different senses. First, six to twelve jurors selected from the
137. Cavallaro, supra note 121; Lippman, supra note 1, at 350-56.
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community and exercising their own consciences might serve as a sam-
ple of the community conscience. Second, the jurors might under-
stand their responsibility as requiring that they exercise the moral
standards which they perceive as representing a consensus of the com-
munity. The first alternative may not, however, provide a highly satis-
factory approach for the purpose of representing the community
conscience. Although juries are selected from the community, they
often include only a nonrepresentative subset of the entire population
as measured by demographic factors. Moreover, no positive effort is
made to secure a sample that represents the range of moral views in
the community.138 Furthermore, the process of voir dire narrows the
sample by providing each lawyer an opportunity to remove at least
some of those who appear to hold inconvenient views.139 In light of
these factors, it is not at all clear that juries applying the consciences
of their members represent the community conscience as accurately as
does the legislature that passed the law to which the jury would pro-
vide an exception through the necessity defense.
According to the second alternative, juries should understand
their role as including the responsibility to identify and represent the
moral standards that are most representative of the community. If
jurors are to exercise community standards, in what way should they
derive these standards? Is there reason to believe that jurors who ac-
cept the responsibility to apply the community standard are likely to
correctly identify it? It seems reasonable to expect that a jury work-
ing collectively to a common conclusion regarding the community
standard is more likely than an individual working in isolation to accu-
rately identify that standard. One should rely on this hypothesis with
some caution, however, for the reasons discussed previously regarding
the limited representativeness of the jury. To the extent that the
members of a jury are drawn from a nonrepresentative subset of the
community, they seem more likely to converge on the standard of that
subset than on one that represents a broad community consensus.
One must also ask whether it is reasonable to expect a commu-
nity to arrive at a consensus that differs significantly from the current
criminal law. The criminal law as written may represent the best evi-
dence of the community consensus regarding basic principles of public
138. SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE M. WRIoHTSMAN, ThE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL 24
(1988) (juries do not provide a representative sample); LAFAVE & IsRAEL, supra note 13, § 22.2
(selection process).
139. LAFAVE & IsRAE_, supra note 13, § 22.3 (challenges).
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morality in a democratic society. In circumstances in which the law
fails to accurately represent a consensus, that failure may often signal
the lack of any clear consensus to represent. The claim here is not
that the criminal law infallibly portrays the informal community con-
science. It is rather that those cases in which the criminal law fails to
reflect such a consensus may well involve issues that remain conten-
tious in the community, and no jury can identify a community consen-
sus that has not yet developed.140
Although the criminal law may represent a close approximation
of the community morality, one might argue that it does so at the level
of relatively broad generalization necessary to establish rules. On the
interpretation of the necessity defense as a residual corrective device,
that defense serves to perfect the law in the sense that it allows the
jury to adjust the generalizations of the law to unusual circumstances.
This argument merely restates the initial problem, however, in that
one must determine whether the generalized rules are to be adjusted
by appeal to the principles of the conventional public morality embod-
ied in the law or by appeal to the informal community conscience. If
the appropriate appeal is the former, the responsibility for the adjust-
ment falls within the jurisdiction of the courts. Alternately, if one en-
dorses the latter approach, one encounters the concerns raised above
regarding the likelihood of any particular jury converging upon an un-
derstanding of the community conscience more accurate than that
represented by the law itself.
In short, the approach to the necessity defense that calls upon the
jury to represent the informal conscience of the community may en-
counter the following dilemma. If the community has arrived at a
broad consensus, the criminal law may well represent the best indica-
tor of that community standard, and thus, the community conscience
supports application of the conventional public morality represented
by the law. This, in turn, requires an interpretation of the lesser evils
according to the law, a function best performed by the court. If the
community has not arrived at a broad consensus regarding the issue,
then the jury cannot represent it.
This notion of necessity as an application of the informal commu-
nity conscience, rather than of the conventional public morality repre-
sented by the law, encounters two additional difficulties. First, as a
140. It is not at all clear that cases of apparent nullification cited by commentators represent
circumstances regarding which a clear community consensus had formed. See, e.g., Levine, supra
note 33, at 480-81; McCoy, supra note 5, at 501-02.
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component of a legal structure justified by liberal principles of polit-
ical morality, it violates one of those principles by subjecting the par-
ticipants in the case to the unenacted moral standards of some
unspecified set of persons, rather than to enacted standards of public
morality regarding which the parties had notice and the opportunity
to participate in developing. Thus, an institution of the public jurisdic-
tion would retrospectively define the public morality for these partici-
pants, subjecting them to standards that had not been enacted at the
time of their conduct and that do not bind other members of the com-
munity, including those jurors who apply the standards to these
participants.14'
The conventional public morality of the liberal society includes
both the substantive content of the law and the institutionalized dem-
ocratic law-making process. This process respects the standing of the
citizen in that it establishes the content of the public morality through
a political process in which competent citizens can participate in col-
lectively deciding which limits on liberty they will accept. It promotes
self-determination by providing notice to citizens regarding the types
of behavior that will elicit legal intervention, either to prevent them
from engaging in such behavior, or to protect them from others who
do so. Finally, it institutionalizes equality of citizenship insofar as it
provides for equal participation and equal liability. Thus, a necessity
defense that applied the informal community conscience would vio-
late the standing of the participants as equal citizens under the law by
subjecting them to standards that were not established as part of the
conventional public morality through the political process that consti-
tutes part of that morality.
Juries are not democratic institutions in that they are not elected
representatives of the electorate or of the participants in the case.
Furthermore, juries that function according to the view presented
here are not responsive to the public in that they neither answer to the
public nor rely on the informal community conscience. At first glance,
juries that function in this manner may seem inconsistent with demo-
cratic government. According to liberal principles of political moral-
ity, however, this nonresponsiveness represents an asset rather than a
defect in the jury system. A jury that confines itself to the conven-
tional public morality represented by the law, rather than responding
to the informal community conscience or public sentiment, treats the




participants with equal respect in that it subjects them only to the
standards that they had the opportunity to participate in enacting and
that apply to others in society.
Apart from the underlying theory of political morality, it remains
mysterious in what sense this defense could constitute a legal defense
insofar as neither the court nor anyone else can determine the param-
eters of the defense for any particular defendant or circumstances un-
til after a jury makes an idiosyncratic decision that applies only to that
case. Thus, the interpretation of the necessity defense as appealing to
the informal community conscience seems incompatible with the
structure of legal defenses generally and of justification defenses
specifically.142
D. NULLIFICATION BEYOND NECEssrrY
If the necessity defense provides a residual justification defense
reflecting the principles of justice embodied in the conventional public
morality represented by the criminal law, nullification, by appealing to
the broader principles of justice that serve as the underlying ends and
values of the system, apparently collapses into that necessity defense.
Does any logical space remain for nullification independent of neces-
sity?14 3 Recall that nullification involves an act of conscience (com-
munity or individual), so accidental deviation and malicious deviation
motivated by considerations such as greed, self-interest, or hate do not
constitute nullification. Misguided appeals to conscience would con-
stitute nullification, and the possibility remains that the institutional
conditions that allow nullification would also provide the opportunity
for malicious deviation.'" However, the mere possibility of errone-
ous or malicious misapplication of a doctrine does not differentiate
nullification from necessity or other legal doctrines, although the rela-
tively unstructured nature of nullification might facilitate such
departures. 45
Jurors might conclude that a conviction required by law would
violate the principles of justice embodied in the conventional public
morality at either of two levels of specificity. First, they might con-
clude that circumstances specific to the case render unjust a verdict
142. RoBINSON, supra note 107, §§ 41, 121.
143. See supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
145. Id. (describing the bi-directional effect of nullification instructions).
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required by some generally justified rule of the criminal justice sys-
tem. Second, they might conclude that some general legal rule repre-
sents a malignant deviation within the liberal structure. They might
conclude, for example, that the specific statute supporting a conviction
for this defendant violates the liberal principles underlying the broad
system.
Consider first the more specific variation in which nullification
appeals to the principles of justice embedded in the law in order to
avoid an unjust verdict resulting from circumstances specific to the
case. This variation duplicates the corrective function of the necessity
defense and therefore nullification and necessity differ only in legal
structure. Necessity takes the form of an explicitly recognized and
instructed defense with relatively clear parameters, but nullification
remains implicit, uninstructed, and relatively vague. Providing nullifi-
cation instructions would render this option explicit, leaving the rela-
tive degree of structure as the only remaining difference. Thus, if one
interprets both as intrasystemic corrective devices intended to allow
departures from specific provisions when circumstances necessitate
doing so in order to comply with the underlying principles of the con-
ventional public morality, the advisability of nullification instructions
seems to rest on an empirical question. That is, would providing these
instructions increase or decrease the degree to which jury decisions
would converge with the purposes and principles underlying the sys-
tem?146 Furthermore, if both doctrines are to serve as corrective de-
vices with explicit instructions, how would the nullification
instructions differ from the necessity instructions, and what would jus-
tify that difference? 147
Insofar as nullification appeals to case-specific circumstances in
light of the principles of justice in the conventional public morality
represented by the law, it collapses into the necessity defense, and jury
instructions regarding this process would duplicate those for the ne-
cessity defense. Furthermore, the process by which the court would
determine whether such instructions were appropriate would dupli-
cate the process of legal analysis appropriate to the necessity defense.
Thus, jury instructions for this variation of intrasystemic nullification
146. See supra notes 32-47 and accompanying text (regarding the unresolved empirical de-
bate about the likely effects of nullification instructions).
147. Instructions that have been recommended differ from those for the necessity defense,




appealing to principles of justice either would duplicate necessity in-
structions, possibly confusing the jury, or would reflect error in the
legal analysis regarding at least one of the two sets of instructions.
Alternately, suppose that the jury concludes that the statute sup-
porting conviction of the defendant constitutes a malignant deviation
from the liberal principles of political morality represented by the law.
Either honest error on the part of legislators or corruption might pro-
duce a statute that is inconsistent with the principles embodied in the
system. Arguably, instructions authorizing nullification in these cir-
cumstances would preserve the underlying principles by protecting the
participants from systemically unjustifiable rules. This argument can-
not support nullification instructions, however, due to the following
dilemma.
Such nullification instructions require that jurors accurately inter-
pret the principles of conventional public morality embodied in the
legal system, identify the malignant rules that undermine these princi-
ples, and nullify when, but only when, these rules provide necessary
conditions for conviction. It seems quite implausible that juries can
fulfill these requirements. If one assumes they cannot, this argument
provides no support for nullification instructions. If one assumes for
the sake of argument that they can, this line of reasoning still fails to
support nullification instructions. Rather, it supports vesting juries
with the authority to categorically invalidate the malignant rules. The
argument supports either the current instructions or jury authority to
overturn legislation, but it does not support the authority to nullify.
These arguments suggest that no logical space remains for in-
trasystemic nullification appealing to the principles of justice embod-
ied in the legal system. The possibility remains, however, that jurors
who receive nullification instructions roughly similar to those en-
dorsed by some commentators might engage in at least two types of
nullification based on an appeal to conscience that would extend be-
yond the scope of necessity.14 First, they might appeal to principles
other than justice embodied in the legal system. This type of nullifica-
tion would resemble necessity insofar as it remains intrasystemic, but
it would not entail the judgement that the defendant's conduct was
justified. Second, they might depart from the legal rules in order to
148. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (regarding recommended nullification
instructions).
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conform to their own consciences independent of the ends and values
of the system.1
49
1. Intrasystemic Nullification Appealing to Mercy
Nullification of the first type might occur, for example, if the ju-
rors were to acquit a legally guilty defendant out of mercy. Advocates
of nullification instructions sometimes discuss nullification and nullifi-
cation instructions in a manner suggesting that "merciful juries" nul-
lify when strict adherence to the law would violate community notions
of justice.150 Justice and mercy, however, are ordinarily understood as
two distinct virtues. Virtuous persons might determine that they
ought to temper justice with mercy or that they ought to exercise
mercy rather than justice in some circumstances, but such a decision
reflects an effort to resolve a conflict between justice and mercy rather
than an exercise of mercy in order to do justice or avoid injustice.
Justice requires that each person receive the treatment he or she de-
serves or merits under the applicable criteria. An individual has a
claim in justice when he or she has not received the treatment due
under those criteria, and a decision maker does justice by distributing
punishment, reward, benefit, or burden according to merit as defined
149. Some might suggest a departure from the legal rules in order to conform to the infor-
mal community conscience as a third alternative. Such a criterion might suggest that in this
manner the jury could serve as the "conscience of the community" through nullification.
This interpretation of nullification encounters most of the same difficulties previously dis-
cussed regarding the corresponding interpretation of necessity. There is no reason to think that
the community will arrive at a consensus regarding the contentious issues often involved in
crimes of conscience or that a jury would reflect any community consensus more accurately than
would the criminal law. A jury that nullifies on the basis of its perception of an informal commu-
nity conscience violates liberal principles of political morality by subjecting the participants to
unenacted standards that were not in effect when they acted, that were not developed through a
political process in which they had an opportunity to vote, and to which others, including these
jurors, are not subject.
Finally, it is not clear in what sense one can say that jurors bring a verdict of conscience if
they ground their decision on the belief that the community endorses these standards rather than
on their own conclusions of conscience. Jurors might believe that a community consensus has
developed regarding a particular issue and, further, upon careful reflection, they might concur.
In this case, however, they nullify on the basis of an extrasystemic standard that they have
adopted as a position of conscience themselves. Thus, they fall into the second category. For all
these reasons, I will not address this interpretation as a distinct type of nullification as an appeal
to conscience.
150. Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 3.
VERDICTS OF CONSCIENCE
by the relevant criteria. Retributive justice requires that officials ad-
minister criminal punishment according to desert as measured by cul-
pability for offenses, as defined by the criminal law.151
Persons engage in acts of mercy when they act from kindness or
compassion in treating another better than justice demands. If X has
a claim in justice against Y, for example, X might exercise mercy by
foregoing that claim against Y as an act of compassion. X might forgo
payment of a debt or decide not to collect compensation owed by Y
because Y has suffered some misfortune that would make it very diffi-
cult for Y to pay the justly owed debt or compensation. Thus, in order
to qualify as an act of mercy, X's act must be motivated by kindness or
compassion, and X must treat Y better than justice requires by forgo-
ing some claim against y.152
Nullification of this type would stand in clear contrast to acquittal
under the necessity defense because jurors who engaged in this type of
nullification would not acknowledge the defendant's conduct as justi-
fied by the ends and values of the system or by any other criteria of
justice. Rather, they would decide to forgo justified punishment as a
matter of compassion. Suppose, for example, that X steals a car, is
pursued by the police, and in the course of the chase crashes the car
into a tree, rendering himself a quadriplegic. Jurors might acquit de-
spite clear evidence of legal guilt because they believed that X has
already suffered enough and that prison would be intolerable for a
quadriplegic. These jurors might understand their decision as consis-
tent with principles embodied within the system in that they might
interpret certain criminal law doctrines such as mitigation or duress as
reflecting recognition of mercy or compassion in the conventional mo-
rality underlying the system.' 5 3
This type of nullification would not adequately address crimes of
conscience for at least two reasons, the first of which applies more
broadly to crimes generally. First, by exercising mercy in the decision
to convict or acquit, rather than in sentencing, this type of nullification
distorts the expressive function of the criminal law. Although it seems
unnecessary, and perhaps even cruel, to subject the quadriplegic thief
151. JOEL FEINBERG, RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDs OF LIBERTY 265-306 (1980) (dis-
cussing noncomparative justice).
152. KATHLEEN D. MOORE, PARDONS 188-92 (1989).
153. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 109, §§ 2.09 (duress), 7.01(a) (mitigation). Even if
these doctrines are not best interpreted in this manner, this would remain an instance of intrasys-
temic nullification, although a misguided one, as long as the jurors were acting out of conscience
by appealing to the ends and values that they understood as embodied in the system.
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to imprisonment, these considerations address an appropriate disposi-
tion. Conviction condemns this illegal conduct as a violation of the
conventional public morality and the actor as one who engaged in
such conduct under conditions of responsibility.154 Although the sub-
sequent injury may well provide a good reason to exercise leniency in
disposition out of compassion, it does nothing to undermine the ap-
propriate institutional condemnation of this type of conduct or the
specific condemnation of this act as violating the conventional public
morality and of this defendant as one who violated that morality
under conditions of responsibility. 155
Furthermore, and most importantly, the acquittal fails to con-
demn the defendant's violation of the victim's sphere of sovereignty.
Thus, it undermines the standing of the victim by acquiescing in the
perpetrator's imputation of a lesser status to the victim. By refusing
to condemn this violation of the innocent victim's sovereignty in order
to exercise compassion for the perpetrator who violated the victim's
standing, the jury indirectly reaffirms the perpetrator's denial of the
victim's status, effectively announcing that violation of this victim's
property rights does not constitute a violation of the conventional
public morality. 5 6 Although the jury may not intend to express this
denigration of the victim's standing, by virtue of its decision to with-
hold condemnation of this violation and apply a standard that does
not apply similarly to violations against themselves or others, the ju-
rors treat this victim as one whose interests merit less protection than
those of other citizens, including themselves.
Second, nullification as an exercise of mercy distorts the symbolic
significance of the conduct engaged in by those who commit crimes of
conscience, and it does so in a manner that demeans these defendants
and denies the significance of their actions. Those who violate a crimi-
nal statute out of the conviction that conscience demands such con-
duct do not contend that they should be excused out of mercy,
compassion, or pity. They do not ask to avoid responsibility for ad-
mittedly faulty behavior. Rather, they violate criminal prohibitions
after careful reflection in order to fulfill their moral obligation as they
understand it, and often for the purpose of confronting officials and
the population at large in order to elicit a public review of the law or
154. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
155. Id. (discussing the levels of condemnation expressed by criminal conviction and
punishment).




policy to which they object."5 7 Those who sincerely engage in crimes
of conscience demand and deserve that officials and the public directly
confront their claims of justification.
Nullification based on mercy denies them this explicit considera-
tion of their claims of justification. It redirects attention away from
the putative justification for their conduct and for the law or policy at
issue and toward considerations of mercy and compassion. Under the
guise of special consideration, such a response denies these defend-
ants respect. Perhaps most importantly, by framing the issue as one of
mercy rather than of justification, officials and the general population
evade their responsibility to reflect upon the law as the official repre-
sentation of the conventional public morality and to decide whether it
is one that a conscientious person can support and apply. Thus, if
crimes of conscience merit an intrasystemic response beyond an ordi-
nary application of the law to the evidence, that response must con-
front the claim that the conduct in question was justified, rather than
appealing to mercy for the defendant.
For all these reasons, intrasystemic nullification appealing to prin-
ciples of mercy in the conventional public morality provides an unsat-
isfactory response to crimes of conscience. In addition, instructions
suggesting such a possibility to the jury as falling within their authority
in the conventional public morality would distort the expressive signif-
icance of conviction and acquittal, misrepresenting the conventional
public morality embodied in the legal system because the current sys-
tem exercises mercy through mitigation in sentencing rather than
through acquittal.158 Thus, nullification instructions of this type,
rather than the current lack of such instructions, would violate the
principles appealed to in the argument from deception and the integ-
rity of the system.' 59
157. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (discussing crimes of conscience and the
purpose of political crimes of conscience in confronting officials and the public).
158. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text (regarding the expressive significance of
conviction and acquittal as differentiating defendants who have violated the law under condi-
tions of responsibility from those who have not). See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 109,
§ 7.01(2); H.L.A. HART, PuNismENTr AND RESPONSMILITY 14-17 (1968). Both sources address
mitigation.
159. See supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text (regarding the argument from deception
and the integrity of the system).
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2. Extrasystemic Nullification
The second type of nullification that does not collapse into neces-
sity occurs when jurors depart from legal rules because they consider
some extrasystemic standards superior. Suppose, for example, that an
elderly couple, Mary and Jim, have had lengthy discussions about the
types of health care they want to accept or reject should either of
them become severely disabled. They each promise the other that
they will not allow the other to "live like that-hooked up to ma-
chines," but they do not write living wills or otherwise clarify the
meaning and scope of this promise. Mary then suffers a severe stroke
that renders her comatose and dependent on a respirator. Jim re-
quests that the hospital remove the respirator, but in the absence of a
written advance directive by Mary, or other witnesses who can con-
firm and clarify Mary's intention in the earlier conversations, the hos-
pital officials refuse to remove the respirator without a court order.
When it becomes clear to Jim that Mary will remain on the respirator
for a relatively lengthy period during the legal process, he concludes
that he is failing Mary in his last promise to her. He quietly walks into
her hospital room, wedges the door closed, and turns off the respira-
tor. When the nursing staff successfully force open the door, they find
Jim holding Mary's hand. He says to them, "you can come in now; she
doesn't have to live like that anymore, just as we promised."
Jim explicitly states that he understood that removing Mary's res-
pirator would cause her legal death and that he deliberately did so
because he had promised her that he would in these circumstances.
He accurately understood that doing so was illegal, and he suffers no
disability that might support an excuse. Jim might even agree that he
has a moral obligation to obey the law generally or the homicide law
specifically. He concluded, however, that his promise to Mary created
a more weighty obligation.
Some jurors might decide to acquit Jim of the homicide charge
despite clear legal guilt. They might acknowledge that neither the
legal rules nor the ends and values underlying the system justify Jim's
conduct.160 They might also agree that the law ought not allow such
action because a system with provisions that allowed individual deci-
sions in such circumstances would be vulnerable to many unjustified
killings by those who would knowingly abuse the rules for their own
160. Some might cogently argue that the values underlying liberal legal institutions support
Jim's decision, but the point here is that some jurors might nullify while denying this.
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convenience, or by those who would make misguided decisions under
severe stress. These jurors might still acquit, however, because they
might believe that Jim's conduct was justified by his personal moral
obligation to Mary and that it would be wrong for them to punish Jim
for fulfilling his obligation. They might agree with Jim's conclusion
that his relationship with Mary generates obligations in the nonpublic
domain that override any obligation he has as a citizen of the public
domain to obey the law against homicide. Furthermore, they might
conclude that as independent moral agents, they have an obligation to
refuse to punish Jim or to express condemnation of him or his con-
duct, and that this obligation overrides their obligation as citizens to
apply the public morality.16' Thus, they might conclude that Jim's de-
cision to kill Mary and their acquittal of Jim would be justified by
moral standards external to the conventional public morality repre-
sented by the legal system.
Jim's conduct would not fit the corrective model because it would
not involve deviation from specific provisions in order to promote the
broader purposes and principles of the system. Similarly, the acquit-
tal would not reflect the corrective model because it would not consti-
tute a legitimated rule departure by officials in service of the purposes
and principles underlying the system.1 62 Rather the acquittal would
reflect the jurors' judgments that Jim's personal moral obligation out-
weighed his obligation to conform to the law and that their duty to
exercise moral judgment as persons outweighed their duty as officials
to apply the rules and broader principles of the law. 63
161. It is also possible that other jurors, with other comprehensive doctrines, might conclude
that Jim's obligation to Mary outweighed any obligation he had to conform to the public moral-
ity, but that their obligation to apply the public morality required a conviction.
162. See supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text (regarding the corrective model and
KADISH & KADIsH's legitimated rule departure).
163. Notice that as Jim and the jurors diverge from the conventional public morality by
appealing to extrasystemic principles, they might reach the same conclusions or different conclu-
sions, and if they reach common conclusions, they might do so for different reasons. Jim, for
example, might be a substantive liberal who believes that his obligation to Mary and her prior
autonomous decision to forgo such treatment overrides the obligations grounded in the conven-
tional public morality. One juror, who is a utilitarian, might decide to nullify because he believes
that doing so in this instance will maximize utility, while another utilitarian juror might refuse to
nullify because she believes that doing so would encourage such decisions, promoting disutility
in the long run. Finally, a third juror, who adopts a particular religious comprehensive doctrine,
might refuse to nullify because in her view, Jim's conduct violated God's will. See supra notes
89-90 and accompanying text (regarding structural liberalism and various comprehensive
doctrines).
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Instructions suggesting that extrasystemic nullification falls within
the legitimate scope of jury responsibilities would violate the funda-
mental principles of a liberal society. The conventional public moral-
ity of a liberal society provides that society with principles of political
morality and with political institutions that citizens can endorse as a
common moral foundation for the public jurisdiction, although these
same citizens pursue divergent comprehensive doctrines.164 This pub-
lic morality grounds common obligations that provide reasons to act
in the public domain. At least in modem complex societies, any plau-
sible institutional structure for the conventional public morality will
include a system of law that can represent that conventional morality
in a relatively consistent, predictable, and enforceable manner and a
process of lawmaking that conforms to liberal principles of political
morality, recognizing the equal standing of citizens as participants in
the democratic lawmaking process. Thus, obligations of the public
morality that provide reasons to support and conform to that public
morality also provide reasons to support and conform to legal institu-
tions that instantiate it. The claim here is not that liberal political mo-
rality entails a general obligation to obey the law, but rather that, at
least in the context of modem complex societies, it generates an obli-
gation to support the rule of law as a process for institutionalizing the
conventional public morality.
Instructions legitimizing extrasystemic nullification would under-
mine the obligation to support the conventional public morality as
embodied in legal institutions because it would license jurors to sub-
ject the defendant and the victim to judgments reflecting the jurors'
nonpublic moral doctrines or their conceptions of the public morality
that ought to be established, rather than to judgments reflecting the
conventional public morality as established by the political process.
By authorizing such decisions by jurors, the court would misapply the
coercive force of the law in subjecting the participants to unpredict-
able standards that they had no opportunity to participate in establish-
ing and that the court will not apply to other citizens, including the
jurors who apply them. Such instructions would sanction such treat-
ment within legal institutions, violating the boundaries of the public
and nonpublic jurisdictions. Such instructions would undermine the
equal standing of both participants as citizens subject only to the pub-
lic morality they had the opportunity to participate in establishing,
164. See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text (discussing political liberalism).
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and not to the individual moral standards of other citizens.165 Thus,
instructions authorizing extrasystemic nullification undermine the
equal standing of the participants and the distinction between the
public and nonpublic morality that lies at the core of the liberal princi-
ples of political morality, and which provides the common moral com-
mitment of citizens who endorse different comprehensive doctrines.
E. SUMMARY
The necessity defense and three different variations of jury nulli-
fication fulfill different roles in relation to the normative structure of a
liberal society, and represent markedly different responses to crimes
of conscience. Acquittal through the necessity defense expresses the
conclusion that the putative crime of conscience was no crime at all.
Rather, the conduct was justified by an appeal to the purposes and
principles embodied in the conventional public morality underlying
the law. This justification defense precludes the condemnation inher-
ent in criminal conviction and punishment because the defendant did
not violate the fully articulated conventional public morality. The
roles of the judge and of the jury, as well as the instructions regarding
this defense, appropriately reflect the justificatory principles embod-
ied in the law as the official representation of the conventional public
morality.
Intrasystemic nullification by an appeal to the principles of justice
embodied in the conventional public morality collapses into the neces-
sity defense in that it represents the judgment that those principles
justify the conduct in question, and thus, that the conduct did not vio-
late the fully articulated conventional public morality. Instructions re-
garding this variant of nullification would either duplicate necessity
instructions or reveal an error in the court's analysis of either neces-
sity or this form of nullification.
Intrasystemic nullification by an appeal to principles other than
justice that are embedded in the system, for example mercy, distorts
the expressive function of the criminal justice process and fails to con-
front the claim advanced by those who engage in crimes of conscience.
Such a verdict vindicates neither the defendant's conduct, the current
law, nor the standing of the victim. Thus, it demeans the defendant as
well as the victim and abdicates the responsibility of the court and of
165. See supra notes 84-101 and accompanying text.
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the public. Nullification instructions of this type, rather than the cur-
rent lack of instructions, would undermine the integrity of the criminal
justice system.
Extrasystemic nullification appeals to moral principles outside of
the conventional public morality. It reflects the jurors' judgment that
the defendant acted rightly according to principles that neither estab-
lish any specific defense within the conventional public morality rep-
resented by the criminal law nor provide the basis for acquittal under
the residual necessity defense. Jurors who acquit a defendant on this
basis abandon their responsibilities under the conventional public mo-
rality and transgress the boundary between the public and nonpublic
domains of jurisdiction in a liberal society. Instructions legitimizing
such a decision as being within the discretion of jurors as participants
in the public morality would undermine the distinction between the
public and nonpublic domains that lies at the foundation of liberal
political morality, and might render the public morality incoherent.
VI. THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF PERSONS IN A
LIBERAL SOCIETY
A. THE ZENGER TRIAL AND NULLIFICATION
1. The Objection from the Zenger Trial
Some might object that those who reject a role for nullification in
a liberal legal system must contend that jurors should not have nulli-
fied in famous historical cases such as that of John Peter Zenger.166
The liberal has two responses to this objection. First, the case does
not apply because the conditions in colonial America at the time of
the Zenger trial did not constitute a liberal society with a legal system
that institutionalized a conventional public morality through a demo-
cratic political process.167 Second, and more central to this Article, it
does not follow from the claim that the law of a liberal society ought
not authorize nullification-that jurors ought never nullify.
166. Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 1, at 89. The Zenger trial is often cited as an example
of laudable jury nullification. A colonial jury acquitted John Peter Zenger of sedition charges
after Andrew Hamilton argued to the jury that they had the right to determine the law and the
facts. Id. at 57.
167. Scott, supra note 6, at 423-24; Simson, supra note 3, at 503-05.
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2. Juror Nullification and Nullification Instructions
Although the conventional public morality gives rise to obliga-
tions that provide reasons for all those who endorse liberal principles
of political morality to conform to that morality in the public domain,
reasons to engage in certain action do not invariably constitute deci-
sive reasons. Obligations provide reasons to act, and these reasons
sometimes conflict.161 Just as the common principles of public moral-
ity in a liberal society provide good reasons to conform to that public
morality, the principles of nonpublic morality contained in the com-
prehensive doctrines of the individual citizens provide good reasons to
act in a manner consistent with those doctrines.1 69 Given relatively
coherent comprehensive doctrines with shared principles of public
morality, it is reasonable to expect that conflicts among reasons aris-
ing within the public and nonpublic domains will occur relatively in-
frequently. Absent implausible assumptions regarding the morally
relevant conditions of human life and the theoretical consistency and
completeness of comprehensive doctrines, however, it is reasonable to
expect that such conflicts will occur.
Recall, for example, the case of Jim and Mary in which Jim com-
mits a crime of conscience grounded in personal obligation arising
from his relationship with Mary.17 0 In these circumstances, Jim might
well recognize the homicide statutes prohibiting his action as legiti-
mate components of the legal representation of the conventional pub-
lic morality. Given the need for generality in law and the danger of
deliberate abuse or unintentional misuse under stress, he might even
agree that these statutes should not provide an exception for the cir-
cumstances such as those he encountered. Jim might therefore en-
dorse the conventional public morality prohibiting his conduct and
agree that he has a strong obligation to conform to the statutes repre-
senting that conventional morality. He might conscientiously decide,
however, that the extended relationship with Mary that has defined a
central aspect of his life gives rise to obligations to keep his promise to
168. JOEL FEMERG, FREEpDOM AND FuFmLMETr 160-61 (1992) (discussing obligations as
supporting and conclusive reasons).
169. This is not an argument for ethical relativism. Rather, insofar as conscience consists of
sincere beliefs based on careful reflection, each citizen has an obligation of conscience to follow
the comprehensive doctrine derived from that process of careful reflection, although that doc-
trine may be misguided. Structural liberals, as such, remain agnostic as to the obligations of
various comprehensive doctrines, although each also endorses a particular comprehensive doc-
trine as a moral agent. Substantive liberals derive obligations from both the public and private
aspects of their liberal morality.
170. See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text (regarding Jim and Mary).
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her that outweigh any reasons he has to conform to the conventional
public morality.
Those who engage in crimes of conscience act on the determina-
tion that some source of moral obligation provides reasons to act
which outweigh any obligations they have to conform to the law rep-
resenting the conventional morality. Those who engage in civil diso-
bedience or conscientious resistance contend that some aspect of law
or policy represents a misguided component of the conventional pub-
lic morality, and they commit crimes of conscience with the intent to
elicit change in that misguided law or policy, or to ameliorate the ef-
fects of it. Others, like Jim, who engage in crimes of personal obliga-
tion, violate the public morality in service of more weighty moral
obligations grounded in their comprehensive doctrines.
Nullification instructions would trivialize these decisions by au-
thorizing jurors to treat the defendants who acted upon them as if
they had engaged in mere variations within the officially established
conventional public morality. These instructions would also trivialize
verdicts of conscience by treating these decisions by jurors as mere
corrective devices for smoothing certain rough edges on the legal sys-
tem, rather than as profound decisions of conscience indicating that
the personal responsibility of the juror as a moral agent overrides any
responsibility to conform to and apply the official representation of
the public morality as a member and temporary official of the political
system. Thus, jury instructions regarding nullification would reduce
the role of citizen and juror from that of an independent moral agent
who participates in a legal system as an institution of social coopera-
tion to that of a functionary whose only significance is that of a partici-
pant in that system.
By blurring the distinction between the juror's roles as a partici-
pant in the legal system and as an independent moral agent, nullifica-
tion instructions would undermine the democratic process and the
fundamental premise of the liberal structure. The distinction between
the public and nonpublic jurisdictions provides the institutional mech-
anism through which the liberal society recognizes the dual roles of
the person as a member of a cooperative society and as an independ-
ent moral agent. These roles ordinarily converge in the democratic
process which allows the individual to participate in the public juris-
diction by exercising the capacities that render him or her a moral
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agent. When unusual circumstances generate a conflict between obli-
gations attaching to each role, however, the legal system cannot incor-
porate the obligations of the nonpublic sphere into the public
jurisdiction through nullification instructions. Any attempt to do so
would violate the standing in the public sphere of the participants in
the case, and it would minimize the significance of individual con-
science by treating it as merely a variation within the conventional
public morality.
Political liberals can provide no formula by which jurors can de-
termine when their obligations as moral persons override their obliga-
tions that attach as citizens of the conventional public morality. One
important consideration involves the standing of individual victims.
Acquittal of a responsible defendant who has violated the rights of an
identified victim indirectly violates the equal standing of that victim
by reaffirming, or at least acquiescing in, the imputation of lesser
standing to the victim by the defendant. 171
Certain crimes of conscience, such as demonstrations involving
disruptions of traffic or of business in public buildings, might incon-
venience many people. These offenses do not impute lesser standing
to any identified individual, however, because those who engage in
them do not single out particular persons, violate their ordinarily pro-
tected interests, and ask the courts to ratify these violations of these
individuals' interests as justified. Thus, nullification regarding these
demonstrations would not impugn the equal status of any identified
person by ratifying the violation of that person's protected interests.
Some crimes of personal moral obligation might express deep respect
for the standing of the other person. Jim's removal of Mary's respira-
tor, for example, reflects his conclusion that Mary's prior expression
of her priorities in the context of their relationship gives rise to an
obligation which outweighs any duties supported by the conventional
public morality.
Other crimes of conscience, such as those involving trespass to
private property or interference with the exercise of individual rights,
directly violate the standing of identified individuals. When the of-
fense charged constitutes a violation of the rights of an identified vic-
tim, nullification denigrates the standing of that victim by withholding
condemnation of that violation and by acquiescing in the defendant's
imputation of lesser standing to that person. A jury that nullifies in
171. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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such a case distorts the expressive function of criminal conviction and
punishment in a manner that misrepresents the central liberal princi-
ple of equal standing in the public jurisdiction, and abdicates the re-
sponsibility of the public institutions to respect and protect the equal
standing of citizens. These imputations of lesser standing to identified
victims provide very strong reasons why jurors ought not nullify re-
garding these crimes. They do not, however, support an invariable
rule that jurors should never nullify in such cases because persons
must weigh any good reasons to act or to refrain from acting against
any countervailing good reasons that may apply.
The expressive significance of nullification as a ratification of the
imputation of lesser standing to an identifiable victim provides a
strong reason for any structural liberal to refuse to nullify in cases
with identified individual victims, but it can carry particular signifi-
cance for the substantive liberal. An imputation of lesser standing vi-
olates a central principle of structural liberalism, but the relative
significance can vary substantially at the level of the comprehensive
doctrine. The structural liberal who endorses a utilitarian comprehen-
sive doctrine, for example, would vest only instrumental value in this
aspect of structural liberalism and might expect a particular instance
of nullification to promote overriding utility, which would be of intrin-
sic value to the utilitarian.
The substantive liberal, in contrast, recognizes individual auton-
omy, including personal sovereignty in the nonpublic sphere as a fun-
damental value.172 Civil disobedience that interferes with a
competent woman's opportunity to exercise her legal right to make
reproductive decisions, for example, imputes lesser standing to her in
the public sphere, and it seriously interferes with her sovereignty in
the nonpublic domain as well as with her ability to define a central
aspect of her life in that nonpublic domain. Thus, the substantive lib-
eral would interpret such a crime of conscience as a transgression
against the conventional public morality, an imputation of lesser
standing in the political domain to the victim, and an intrusion into the
victim's domain of sovereignty. These considerations provide the sub-
stantive liberal juror with very strong reasons not to nullify regarding
crimes of conscience with identified individual victims. They do not,
however, establish an invariable rule that substantive liberals should




never nullify regarding such crimes of conscience. Rather, they pro-
vide very strong reasons that jurors must weigh against all other mor-
ally relevant reasons.173
In order to constitute verdicts of conscience or crimes of con-
science, the actions of jurors or defendants must be deliberate rather
than accidental and conscientious rather than malicious.174 Does de-
liberate action motivated by a sincere belief that a principle requires
that action suffice, however, to qualify an act as an act of conscience?
Consider, for example, the racial separatist who burns crosses on the
lawns of interracial couples because he sincerely believes that the Bi-
ble condemns miscegenation and requires that all Christians publicly
repudiate the practice. Does this individual's sincere belief qualify
these offenses as acts of conscience, and would acquittal through nulli-
fication by jurors who share these beliefs constitute verdicts of
conscience?' 75
Acting from the sincere belief that an action is morally right is
necessary but not sufficient to qualify behavior as an act of conscience.
Such a belief is analytically necessary because it is inherent in the con-
cept of acting from conscience.' 76 A sincere belief is not sufficient,
however, because acts of conscience require not only that one act
from conscience, but also that one reason responsibly to conscience.
That is, conscientious action requires not only that one deliberately
acts in a manner that is consistent with what one believes to be mor-
ally correct conduct, but also that one engages in a careful, responsible
173. Given the juror's need to carefully weigh such a complex set of reasons, it may seem
reasonable to ask whether the legal system ought to provide some vehicle by which all relevant
information comes before the jury. On the theory advanced here, the criminal justice system
should provide only the information relevant to the conventional public morality. The juror, as
an independent moral agent, must consider all morally relevant reasons to act, but reasons that
carry normative force only in the juror's comprehensive doctrine are not relevant to the conven-
tional public morality. If the criminal justice system provided such information, it would violate
the conventional public morality of which it is an institutional representation and undermine the
principles of liberal morality that justify its function. That is, from the perspective of the conven-
tional public morality, the legally relevant information is the only relevant information.
174. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (regarding the necessary properties of nullifi-
cation as a conscientious verdict).
175. Cf. McCoy, supra note 5, at 501 (citing Southern juries refusing to convict white de-
fendants for murdering blacks or civil rights workers as an example of nullification).
176. II OxFoRD ENGLIsH DxcrroNARY 845 (1993) (defining conscience as "[t]he internal
acknowledgment or recognition of the moral quality of one's motives and actions; the sense of
right and wrong as regards things for which one is responsible"); Benjamin, supra note 48, at 469
("Conscience" refers most generally to conscious awareness of the moral quality of one's
action.).
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process of deliberation in making that determination. 177 Thus, acts of
conscience must represent a sincere belief in the moral correctness of
the act and a conscientious process of deriving and maintaining that
belief. Crimes or verdicts of conscience in a generally justifiable social
structure involve a choice among morally relevant reasons to act. In
confronting this choice, the individual encounters explicit notice that
there are at least some morally relevant reasons to refrain from acting
in the manner contemplated. This notice provides good reason to
question the principles and circumstances the individual understands
as supporting the conscientious action.
Thus, the conscientious moral agent can never take it as obvious
that a crime or verdict of conscience is justified. Rather, in order to
qualify as an authentic act of conscience, a conscientious decision to
perform criminal conduct or to bring a verdict contrary to the law in a
generally just social structure requires that the actor engage in careful
deliberation on the proposed action and on the principles thought to
support that action. One who purports to act conscientiously but re-
fuses to carefully examine the basis for that conduct does not respon-
sibly derive conscience and, therefore, does not engage in an act of
conscience. 78 Careful deliberation does not guarantee accurate con-
clusions, however, and one who fulfills this requirement of careful de-
liberation may engage in unjustified conduct. Acts of conscience do
not necessarily constitute justified action.179
The expressive significance of nullification for the equal standing
of innocent victims must weigh heavily in the process of deliberation
to the conscience that is required in order to qualify nullification as an
authentic verdict of conscience. That a crime or verdict of conscience
imputes lesser standing to an innocent victim provides good reason to
refrain from engaging in that offense or from bringing that verdict,
and it provides good reason to doubt that such conduct is right. These
177. II OxFoRD ENGLISH DIcrIONARY, supra note 176, at 846. One is conscientious if one
is, "[o]bedient or loyal to conscience; habitually governed by a sense of duty; scrupulous." To be
scrupulous is to be, "cautious or meticulous in acting, deciding, etc.... characterized by a strict
and minute regard for what is right." IX OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTOnNARY 293 (1993). Benjamin,
supra note 48, at 470 (conscience as the culmination of conscientious reflection).
178. Two clarifications are relevant here. First, the requirement of deliberation does not
necessarily require the type of analytic reflection one might expect from one who is analytically
trained. Rather, it requires careful, sincere reflection upon and attempts to ascertain the ade-
quacy of one's reasons for action. Second, the duration of deliberation cannot be evaluated
without allowing for circumstances that might require a rapid decision.
179. Benjamin, supra note 48, at 472.
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reasons arise from the normative significance of conscience and from
the principles of liberal political morality.
The normative significance of conscience reflects its relationship
to the integrity of the person. Deliberation of conscience involves
conscientious reflection on the convictions and principles that provide
the foundation of one's identity as a person and define one's life as an
extended project. Thus, respect for acts of conscience reflects respect
for persons in that an authentic act of conscience reveals careful re-
flection on the underlying convictions that define the unique identity
of the actor.' s0 Putative acts of conscience that impute lesser standing
to innocent victims directly conflict with this foundation in respect for
persons because they express disrespect for those innocent victims.
This tension does not reflect a categorical rule precluding such acts of
conscience because upon careful reflection, one might conclude that
overriding reasons require the action despite this very strong reason
to refrain from engaging in it.
Conduct that undermines an individual's equal standing violates a
basic principle of the liberal political morality. Thus, the mere fact
that contemplated acts of conscience will have this effect provides lib-
erals with good reason to doubt and to carefully review the process by
which they derived their positions of conscience as well as the conclu-
sions that they ought to engage in such conduct. Overriding reasons
grounded in the public or nonpublic domain might persuade them that
they ought to engage in the conduct or bring the verdict despite this
good reason not to do so. If they then act on that conclusion, they
ought to do so reluctantly and regretfully, recognizing that they can
justify that decision as, at best, a lesser evil."'
Nullification instructions authorizing jurors to exercise their con-
sciences in their decisions of legal guilt and innocence attempt to in-
corporate all obligation and responsibility into legal obligation and
responsibility. Such instructions incorporate nullification into the
legal structure of the public morality, blurring the central liberal dis-
tinction between the public and nonpublic domains. This blending of
public and nonpublic morality discourages jurors, officials, and the
population in general from fully appreciating and confronting the
180. Id. at 470-72.
181. JutrrH J. THOMSON, THm RA LM OF RIGHTS 82-98 (1990) (discussing a moral residue
that remains when one must fail to fulfill an obligation to one person due to more weighty
incompatible obligations).
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depth with which crimes and verdicts of conscience challenge the offi-
cially established conventional morality. This loss of clarity obfuscates
the need for conscientious reflection on the public morality, and on
the tension that can arise between the obligations of political justice in
the liberal society and the obligations that each person assumes
through the comprehensive doctrine by which he or she orders a life.
This tension arises from the obligations to support a system of
law instantiating the conventional public morality, and to retain au-
thority and responsibility for one's own decisions and actions as a
moral person. This second obligation is inherent in the notion of a
moral agent who is capable of fulfilling the role of a responsible citi-
zen in the public domain, and of developing a life in accord with some
comprehensive doctrine in the protected domain of nonpublic moral-
ity. In short, nullification instructions would trivialize the challenges
to the public morality embodied in crimes of conscience and verdicts
of conscience, and they would obscure the fundamental questions re-
garding the responsibilities of persons as subjects of the law represent-
ing the public morality and as independent moral agents.
3. Judicial Nullification
As previously discussed, the necessity defense provides an in-
trasystemic corrective device through which courts acquit defendants
who have violated an offense definition in circumstances in which no
specific defense applied and in which that conduct was necessary in
order to avoid a greater evil, according to the conventional public mo-
rality represented by the law."8 The judge must determine whether
the defendant has met the burden of production regarding the ele-
ments of the offense in order to decide whether to allow evidence and
instruct the jury regarding the defense.183 In making this determina-
tion, the judge should appeal to the principles of the conventional mo-
rality represented by the legal system, rather than to the principles of
his comprehensive doctrine because the defense serves as an intrasys-
temic corrective device. 8 4
182. See supra notes 127-42 and accompanying text (regarding the necessity defense).
183. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text (discussing the judge's determination
regarding the necessity defense).
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Suppose that Jim is brought to trial for murdering Mary by re-
moving her respirator."8 5 Jim admits that he purposely caused Mary's
death; he acted in order to fulfill their mutual promise not to allow the
other to "live like that-hooked up to machines." The investigation
clearly establishes that Jim premeditated because the night before he
removed Mary's respirator, he prepared to carry out his decision by
carving the wooden wedge that prevented the hospital staff from
opening the door and intervening. Psychological evaluation of Jim
reveals that at the time he acted, he was distressed about Mary's ill-
ness and about his failure to keep his promise to her, but he clearly
understood the medical and legal circumstances and suffered no disa-
bility that might support any type of excuse or claim of diminished
capacity.
Jim's defense attorney seeks to admit evidence and elicit jury in-
structions regarding the necessity defense. The attorney intends to ar-
gue that Jim's conduct was necessary in order to avoid a greater evil
because Mary's decision in her discussions with Jim demonstrates that
continued existence in a state of dependence on the respirator would
constitute greater harm to her previously expressed interests than
would her death due to the removal of the respirator in compliance
with her expressed preference.
The state supreme court has directly rejected this argument in a
similar case of euthanasia approximately two years ago. At that time,
the trial court refused to allow evidence and instructions regarding the
necessity defense. The defendant was convicted of murder, appealed,
and the state supreme court affirmed the conviction, expressly ruling
that the necessity defense did not apply to cases involving euthanasia.
Shortly after the supreme court decided that case, a legislator intro-
duced a bill in the state legislature that would have allowed a spouse
to demand the removal of respirators or other life-sustaining equip-
ment in circumstances such as those involved in the case of Jim and
Mary and in the earlier case. The bill was defeated by a large majority
in the legislature, partially in response to several state-wide surveys
that demonstrated broad popular opposition to any legalization of
euthanasia.
It seems clear in these circumstances that the conventional public
morality represented by the law does not authorize the judge to allow
evidence, argument, or instructions regarding the necessity defense.
185. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text (describing the facts in the case of Jim
and Mary).
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The conventional public morality subordinates the judge's authority to
interpret that morality to both the legislature and the supreme court,
both of which have expressly determined that the public morality does
not accommodate the defense attorney's argument for judgment of
relative evils. Upon review of the defense attorney's argument, the
relevant case law, and the legislative history, the trial judge concludes
that the conventional public morality does not allow her to instruct or
admit evidence regarding the necessity defense in these circumstances.
Suppose, however, that the trial judge is a substantive liberal who
firmly believes that if the evidence supports Jim's story, Jim's conduct
was morally required both because the ongoing maintenance on the
respirator constituted a severe intrusion into Mary's domain of sover-
eignty, and by virtue of Jim's obligation to Mary in the nonpublic
sphere arising from their mutual promises in the context of their ex-
tended intimate relationship. The judge understands her responsibili-
ties arising from her official position in the political structure as
supporting a strong obligation to discharge her official function by ap-
plying the public morality represented by the law rather than her com-
prehensive doctrine when the two conflict. She, like those who serve
on juries, however, does not escape her responsibilities as an in-
dependent moral agent when she accepts an official role. Her obliga-
tions arising from her official responsibilities provide strong reasons to
conform to the conventional public morality represented by the law,
but strong reasons do not necessarily constitute decisive reasons.
If, for example, the judge firmly believes after careful delibera-
tion that Jim had a strong obligation to Mary to remove the respirator,
that it would be wrong to punish Jim for fulfilling that obligation, and
that it would be wrong for her to participate in that process, it remains
an open possibility that her obligations arising from her comprehen-
sive doctrine and her status as an independent moral agent might
override her obligations to apply the conventional public morality.
Should this judge decide to allow evidence, argument, and instructions
regarding the necessity defense, however, this apparent application of
the intrasystemic necessity defense would actually constitute an exer-
cise of extrasystemic judicial nullification as an act of conscience.
The claim here is not that she ought to conclude that her compre-
hensive doctrine supports stronger reasons than those arising from the
conventional public morality and, therefore, that she ought to allow
the defense. Rather, the example illustrates two points. First, both
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the public morality and her comprehensive doctrine support obliga-
tions that provide morally relevant reasons. Thus, the reasons and re-
sponsibilities arising from her official role in institutions of the public
morality do not take categorical priority such that one can conclude
that judges ought never give priority to morally relevant reasons
grounded in the comprehensive doctrine over those grounded in the
public morality. Second, if she allows evidence, argument and instruc-
tions regarding the necessity defense because she concludes that rea-
sons grounded in her comprehensive doctrine override those
grounded in the public morality, she engages in judicial nullification.
In short, judges, like jurors, remain persons who may encounter cir-
cumstances in which obligations conflict and no algorithm provides a
clear decision rule.
By virtue of their official roles, judges arguably take stronger ob-
ligations to apply the official public morality than do jurors. Judicial
decisions ordinarily carry more profound institutional impact. Judges
make decisions that carry precedential force, influencing unpredict-
able numbers of cases and participants in the future. If citizens con-
clude that judges frequently depart from the public morality in order
to conform to their own nonpublic standards, this belief might well
erode public confidence in public institutions and undermine volun-
tary cooperation with those institutions. Alternately, if citizens inter-
pret these judicial decisions as reflecting the public morality, this
perception will distort the expressive function of the judicial process
by misrepresenting an exercise of the judge's nonpublic comprehen-
sive doctrine as an expression of the public morality.
These arguments support the conclusion that by virtue of their
institutional role, judges take a very strong obligation to conform to
the public morality rather than to their comprehensive doctrines when
the two conflict. Very strong obligations provide very strong reasons,
however, rather than necessarily decisive reasons. Nothing in these
arguments rules out the possibility that in extraordinary circumstances
reasons arising from the nonpublic comprehensive doctrine might pre-
vail. A critic might contend that judges should never consider reasons
arising from their nonpublic comprehensive doctrines because they
take an oath to apply the law. The oath provides a very good reason
for conforming to the law, but absent an argument explaining why
oaths uniquely provide a special type of reason that can never be
overridden by other morally relevant reasons, it does not establish a
categorical priority for obligations arising from the public morality.
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This potential conflict among obligations grounded in the public
and nonpublic domains of morality can arise for any structural liberal.
A utilitarian judge, for example, might support structural liberalism as
the form of political organization most likely to maximize utility in the
long run. Yet, that judge might encounter unusual circumstances in
which it appears that departing from obligations arising from the judi-
cial role in the conventional public morality would result in a clear
balance of utility over disutility without significantly undermining the
utilitarian benefits of the institutional structure.
This conflict can take a particularly cogent form for the substan-
tive liberal. Although any independent moral agent retains a respon-
sibility to evaluate and act upon all morally relevant reasons, the
substantive liberal vests fundamental value in individual autonomy,
including the exercise of autonomous capacities such as reflection and
deliberation in the pursuit of autonomous virtues such as self-direc-
tion, and in the process of defining a human life of one's own. 186
Thus, the substantive liberal grants substantial weight to the impor-
tance of retaining the authority and responsibility to consider all rele-
vant factors in any decision that significantly affects the moral quality
of one's life. By devoting a significant portion of one's life to the role
of a judge in the institutions of public morality, however, the substan-
tive liberal also vests substantial value in discharging that responsibil-
ity as a major component of the life he defines. In short, the
substantive liberal judge's comprehensive doctrine emphasizes both
the responsibility to discharge the institutional obligations associated
with the role that constitutes a major commitment in that judge's life,
and the responsibility to deliberate carefully on all reasons relevant to
significant life decisions, including reasons that conflict with those
arising from institutional obligations.
This tension among reasons to act encountered by the substantive
liberal judge represents a special case of a tension encountered more
broadly by substantive liberals. Those who endorse the substantive
liberal comprehensive moral doctrine vest fundamental value in a
principle of autonomy including the exercise of personal sovereignty
in developing a life of one's own and in cultivating the autonomous
virtues. Retaining the authority and responsibility for one's central
life decisions is critical to this project. Yet, at least in complex modern
societies, public institutions ruled by law probably provide the only
plausible social structure that can establish the conditions of fair and
186. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text (discussing substantive liberalism).
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predictable social cooperation which will allow each to define and
pursue a life as an extended project. Thus, the substantive liberal
comprehensive doctrine provides good reasons to endorse and protect
the rule of law as well as to retain the authority and responsibility to
depart from that law when overriding reasons obtain.
B. CONFLICTING OBLIGATIONS: TENSION RATHER THAN
CONTRADICTION
Some critics might contend that these conflicting obligations aris-
ing from the public and nonpublic domains reveal a fatal contradiction
in liberalism. A central contradiction in the theory would eviscerate
the integrity of the theory in that one can infer any proposition from a
contradiction. 8 7 This unavoidable tension does not, however, consti-
tute a contradiction in liberal political morality. Two statements are
contradictory only if they are inconsistent; that is, if they cannot both
be true under any circumstances. Consistent statements can both be
true under some state of affairs.' Analogously, the obligations to
support a system of law representing the conventional public morality
and to retain moral authority and responsibility regarding one's ac-
tions are consistent in that the individual can fulfill both under some
circumstances. Moreover, these obligations usually converge in a gen-
erally just society. Ordinarily, for example, jurors can fulfill both by
conscientiously applying the law. That liberal political morality occa-
sionally encounters this tension demonstrates the complex set of prin-
ciples, concerns, and circumstances that real people must consider in
their moral decisions as citizens of a society, participants in relation-
ships, and sovereign moral agents. In short, it is a virtue rather than a
defect of liberal political morality that it occasionally encounters this
tension because in doing so, it reflects the complexity of moral life.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although some might raise historical or analytic questions about
verdicts of conscience and crimes of conscience, those who want to
determine whether courts ought to instruct jurors regarding nullifica-
tion or necessity as falling within the scope of their authority as jurors
need a normative theory that justifies a particular role for juries within
a more broadly justified institution of criminal justice. Liberal princi-
ples of political morality support a criminal justice system in which the
187. PASCAL ENGEL, THE NoRM oF TRUTH 222, 372 (1991).
188. Id. at 372; BL.cK, RmN, supra note 77, at 78, 81.
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necessity defense serves as a residual intrasystemic corrective device.
It appropriately applies to putative crimes of conscience only when
the conduct constituting the offense qualifies as a lesser evil than the
evil avoided according to the principles of the conventional public mo-
rality represented by the law. In such cases, the putative crimes of
conscience do not actually constitute crimes at all because they do not
violate the fully articulated conventional public morality.
Intrasystemic nullification by an appeal to the principles of justice
embodied in the criminal law collapses into necessity. Intrasystemic
nullification by an appeal to principles other than justice, for example
mercy, embodied in the criminal law distorts the expressive function
of the criminal process and fails to confront the significance of crimes
of conscience. Under the guise of concern for those who commit
crimes of conscience, such a verdict denies them respect. Extrasys-
temic nullification and jury instructions regarding this alternative have
no legitimate role within the criminal process as an institution of the
conventional public morality because extrasystemic nullification in-
volves the decision by jurors that some obligations arising in the non-
public domain override any obligation they have as participants in the
criminal justice process of the public morality. Either jurors or judges
may encounter circumstances in which they determine that they ought
to act contrary to the public morality, but judicial instructions cannot
incorporate these determinations into the public morality. Any at-
tempt to do so would trivialize verdicts of conscience and crimes of
conscience.
Finally, recall the question regarding the normative force of legal
obligation and individual conscience. At least in the context of mod-
em complex societies, persons need legal institutions that provide the
social structure which allows them to order social interaction in a
manner that maintains a relatively predictable public domain while
protecting a nonpublic domain within which they can define their lives
as individuals and as participants in relationships. We should not,
however, expect too much of the law. It cannot order the nonpublic
domain, and it cannot provide an alternative to individual deliberation
by persons when obligations arising in the public and nonpublic do-
mains conflict.
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